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I  INTRODUCTION 
 
International Organizations (‘IOs’) have been in existence for a long time dating to as far back as 
1875 when the Universal Postal Union was set up.1  Over the years various aspects of their 
existence and role in international law have come under scrutiny. A defining moment in the 
existence of IOs perhaps came with the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) in Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations2 in which the Court 
pronounced on the international legal personality status of IOs.  
 The case concerned an agent of the United Nations (UN) who had died on duty. The 
question before the Court was whether the UN could bring an international claim on behalf its 
agent where that agent dies or is injured in the line of duty. This was in essence a question of 
whether the UN had the requisite legal personality to bring such a claim. The Court stated that the 
UN could not effectively discharge its duties or mandate as intended by its founders without the 
possession of an international legal personality.3 The Court therefore concluded that the UN is an 
international person4 with the capacity to bring the relevant claims as and when required to aid the 
performance of its functions.5 The possession of legal personality is now included in the Draft 
Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (DARIO).6  
 The Reparations Case7 thus opened the door way to the possession and exercise of the 
various rights of IOs at international law. The reverse is also true however, in that IOs can also be 
held legally responsible for wrongful acts or omissions. It is, after all, a basic principle of law that 
the possession of legal personality entails not only the capacity to bring claims but also the capacity 
to handle claims brought against the concerned entity.  
                                                          
1 Antonio Cassesse International Law 2 ed (2005) at p. 136. 
2[1949] ICJ Reports, 174. 
3 Reparations supra note 2 p.179. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Supra note 2 p. 180. 
6 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2011, Vol II, Part 2, para 2 (a). 
7 Supra, note 2. 
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 At international law, the principle is well settled that the commission of an internationally 
wrongful act, attracts responsibility.8 In reality however, the matter concerning responsibility for 
internationally wrongful acts is complicated and continues to be the subject of debate.9 While this 
is true for both State Responsibility and the Responsibility of IOs, the question becomes more 
complicated when dealing with the latter. This is because of the various problematic factors which 
must be considered in any attempts to hold IOs responsible for their wrongful actions. Such 
problematic factors include the lack of appropriate forums in which disputes concerning IOs can 
be resolved, immunities of IOs and the sometimes complex task of determining whether wrongful 
conduct should be attributed to an IO or to the IOs member states.10   
One major consequence of these problems concerning the responsibility of IOs is that it is 
often difficult for individuals who have suffered harm at the instance of an IO, to seek redress. 
Indeed in its quest and perhaps haste, to deal with the question of responsibility, international law 
often overlooks the plight of those who have suffered at the behest of actions perpetrated by IOs. 
The International law approach on the question of responsibility is often from the perspective of 
the IOs and not from the victims or prospective victims of wrongful acts. For instance, while the 
DARIO acknowledge that IOs can commit wrongful acts, there is a complete lack of 
acknowledgement that such acts can be committed against individuals.11  
                                                          
8 This principle was stated as early as 1927 in the Chorzow Factory Case (Claim for Indemnity) {1927} Publ. PCIJ, 
Series A, Judgment No 8, p.21. Both Article 1 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility and Article 3 of the 
DARIO provide for this principle.  
9 For some discussions on State Responsibility see TW Bennet & J. Strug Introduction to International Law (2013) 
265, James Crawford ‘The ILC’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts: A 
Retrospect’ (2002) 96 AM. J. Int’l L. 874, Antonio Cassese, ‘The Nicaragua and Tadic Test Revisited in Light of the 
ICJ Judgment on Genocide in Bosnia’ (2007) 18(4) European Journal of International Law 649 and Richard J. 
Goldstone & Rebecca J. Hamilton (2008), ‘Bosnia v Serbia: Lessons from the Encounter of the International Court 
of Justice with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’, (2008) 21(1) Leiden Journal of 
International Law pp 91-112. For Discussions on the responsibility of International Organizations see Kristina 
Daurgidas ‘Reputation and the Responsibility of International Organizations’  (2015) 25(4) European Journal of 
International Law, 991, Nikolaos Vulgaris ‘Rethinking Indirect Responsibility: A study of Article 17 of the Draft 
Articles of International Organizations’ (2014) 11 International Organizations Law Review, 5-52, Christiane 
Ahlborn ‘The Rules of International Organizations and the Law of International Responsibility’ (2011) 8 
International Organizations Law Review 397-482.  
 
10 For an overview of some of these factors see generally Jose E. Alavarez ‘International Organizations and the Rule 
of Law’(2016) 14 NZJPIL 3, Niels Blokker, ‘Member State Responsibility for Wrongdoings of International 
Organizations’(2015) 12 International Organizations Law Review 319 and Cedric Ryngaert and Holly Buchanan, 
‘Member State Responsibility for Acts of International Organizations’ (2011) Utrecht Law Review 7.   
11 See generally Armin von Bogdandy and Mateja Steinbruck Platise, ‘ARIO and Human Rights Protection: Leaving 
Victims in the Cold’ (2012) International Organisations Law Review, 67.   
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The problem with the IO centered approach is that it often glosses over and sidesteps the 
difficult questions concerning seeking redress against IOs, especially for victims of wrongful acts. 
The result is that victims trying to seek redress for wrongful acts committed by IOs often leave 
empty handed.   
By way of illustration, in Behrami and Behrami v France12 the applicants in this case were 
left with no remedy after the European Court of Human Rights attributed to the United Nations 
the internationally wrongful acts suffered. The case concerned the death of the son to the first 
Applicant and the serious injury of the second applicant due to the detonation of a cluster bomb 
unit left behind after the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) airstrikes in Kosovo in 
1999. The UN could not however be held responsible for the impugned actions because it is not a 
party to the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). Neither NATO nor France (the other 
concerned parties in the events in Kosovo) accepted responsibility. Similarly in the now famous 
case of Georges v United Nations,13 the Court dismissed claims against the UN for the cholera 
outbreak in Haiti on the basis of the absolute immunity of the UN. The Court of first instance’s 
decision was upheld on appeal.14 This was despite the fact that there is credible evidence linking 
the cholera outbreak to the conduct of UN peace keeping forces.15 These and other cases will be 
analysed in detail in Chapter 3 of this thesis.   
It is ironic that International Law has endeavoured to develop elaborate rules of trying to 
apportion or attribute responsibility, however these rules have more or less ignored those who are 
supposed to benefit from them in the first place. In this thesis therefore, the question of the 
responsibility of IOs is approached from the perspective of the victims of the wrongful conduct of 
IOs. The call for greater effectiveness in holding IOs to account is made through an illustration of 
the difficulties faced by those attempting to seek redress for wrongs committed by IOs. The 
prevailing argument throughout this thesis is that the effective redress of wrongful acts committed 
                                                          
12 (2007) 45 EHRR 85. 
13Georges v United Nations 84 F Supp 3d 246 (SD NY 2015). See also Femi Falana v African Union AfCHPR, App 
No. 001/2011, available at http://www.african-court-.org/en/index.php/55-finalised-case-details/833-app-no-001-
2011-femi-falana-v-african-union-details and Efoua Mbozo’o Samuel v Pan African Parliament AfCHPR App No. 
010/2011 available at http://www.african-court-.org/en/index.php/55-finalised-case-details/842-app-no-010-2011-
efoua-mbozo-o-samuel-v-pan-african-parliament-details. 
14 See Georges v United Nations No. 15-455(2d Cir 2016) available at 
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca2/15-455/15-455-2016-08-18.html accessed on 7 February, 
2020. 
15 See Infra notes 238-240 and accompanying texts.  
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by IOs is significantly undermined by the numerous problems encountered when victims are 
seeking justice. It is further argued that international law does not adequately address the plight of 
victims of the wrongful conduct of IOs.    
Additionally, the role of domestic systems and institutions as possible solutions to the 
difficult question of holding IOs accountable or responsible for their actions will be examined. 
This analysis is necessary in light of the recent increasing trend of domestic courts piercing the 
immunity veil in order to preside over disputes concerning IOs.16 In this regard an examination of 
whether domestic courts represent the light at the end of the tunnel for individuals who have been 
wronged by IOs will be conducted. 
 
II  PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
The theory is well settled: violation of international law will attract responsibility and an obligation 
to make the necessary reparations.17 Practically speaking however it is problematic to hold IOs 
liable for their actions and this fact has been acknowledged. The problem is that international law 
approaches the question of responsibility from the perspective of IOs. There is less emphasis on 
the plight of victims of wrongful acts or omissions committed by IOs or the difficulties they 
encounter in order to seek redress. In this regard the following research questions are asked: 
1. How accessible is justice for victims of wrongful acts committed by IOs? 
2. What are the obstacles which individuals face in seeking redress for wrongful acts 
committed by IOs? 
3. Do domestics systems and institutions have a role to play in assisting individuals to obtain 




                                                          
16 See generally Cedric Ryngaert, ‘The Immunity of International Organisations before Domestic Courts: Recent 
Trends,’ (2010) 7 International Organisations Law Review 121. 
17 Supra, note 8. 
13 
 
III  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The Reparations Case18 established the important principle of international legal personality which 
as Hennie Strydom19 notes is critical not only to the functions of an International Organization but 
also to the determination of its rights and responsibilities. In the aftermath of the Reparations Case 
however, the emphasis was on the rights of IOs. There was less emphasis on the question of the 
responsibility of IOs.20 The increased influence and impact of IOs however, has necessitated a shift 
from the rights of IOs to their duties, especially in matters of accountability.21 
 The starting point in any consideration on or analysis of the responsibility of IOs is that 
IOs will incur responsibility if they violate international law. As Jan Klabbers puts it ‘there is 
nothing exotic about holding International Organizations responsible…’22 This is perhaps the 
natural consequence of being an international legal person who has rights as well as obligations in 
the international legal system. In as much as IOs have the right to bring claims on the basis that 
their legal status allows them to do so per the Reparations Case,23 international law will or should 
also hold IOs responsible for any violations by virtue of the same status. C.F. Amerasinghe puts it 
this way: 
…(i) international organizations as legal persons are subjects of and subjects to international law; 
and (ii) the breach of international law by an international person, whether by commission or 
omission, produces responsibility. Thus, international responsibility of or to international 
organizations depends on the violation of international law and the non-observance of international 
obligations.24 
 The theory is thus very clear, IOs will bear responsibility for any (international law) 
violations. The reality however is very different. Holding IOs responsible for wrongful acts is not 
a straightforward issue. Among the reasons for this difficulty is the very nature of international 
law. Nigel White notes that, legal accountability (which includes responsibility for purposes of 
                                                          
18 Supra, note 2. 
19 Hennie Strydom (ed) International Law, (2016) 150. 
20 See a discussion on this point by Jan Klabbers Introduction to International Institutional Law 2ed (2009) p. 272. 
21 See for instance Noelle Quenivet ‘Binding the United Nations to Human Rights Norms by way of the Laws of 
Treaties’ (2010) 42 George Washington International Law Review 587 arguing for the need to make the UN more 
accountable. 
22 Klabbers op-cit note 20 at p. 279. 
23 Supra note 2. 
24 C.F. Amerasinghe Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations, 2ed (2005) p. 386.  
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this thesis)25 in the international legal system is limited, even for States which are considered the 
traditional subjects of international law.26 States have at their disposal the ICJ which is a permanent 
structure or forum within which disputes can be resolved and more importantly State responsibility 
determined. Although this is the case however, States have to consent to the jurisdiction of the 
ICJ.27 If there is no consent from the disputing parties, the Court will not preside over the dispute 
in question. This perhaps lends credence to the theory that international law is consent based.28 
 Unlike States however, IOs do not have a right of audience before this primary international 
Court as only States may be parties to disputes before the ICJ.29 Disputes concerning IOs are 
resolved in fora such as administrative tribunals, Claims Commissions or through ad hoc 
arbitration and negotiations among other less permanent avenues.  Herein lies one of the major 
problems in the responsibility regime of IOs. In commenting on the existence of the DARIO, Niels 
Blokker states that while there are ‘rules’ determining the responsibility of IOs, there is a glaring 
absence of a ‘responsibility institution’.30 This institution would ideally be tasked with the 
responsibility of determining whether an IO has committed an internationally wrongfully act and 
also determining the necessary remedial measures.31 Phillipe Sands and Pierre Klein however 
argue that the ad hoc fora are quite useful in determining the responsibility of International 
Organizations.32 It can indeed be argued that the ad hoc fora perform the necessary and important 
function of filling a gap which the absence of a more permanent structure creates. The question 
however is, how effective are these ad hoc fora and do they afford the necessary protection to 
victims of wrongful acts committed by IOs?  This is one of the issues that this thesis will be 
addressing. 
                                                          
25 It has been suggested that the word ‘accountability’ is broader and covers liability and responsibility but also to 
the extent to which IOs are subject to internal and external scrutiny.  See Henry G. Schemers and Niels M. Blokker 
International Institutional Law, (2003) at p. 1005. 
26 Nigel White, The Law of International Organizations, 2ed (2005), p. 206. 
27 Article 36(1), (2) and (5) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
28 See for instance Samantha Besson, ‘State Consent and Disagreement in International Law-making. Dissolving the 
Paradox.’ (2016) Leiden Journal of International Law.289 at pp 305-309 where the author argues for and justifies 
the role of consent in international law.  
29 Article 34(1) of the Statute of the ICJ United Nations, 18 April 1946, available at: 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3deb4b9c0.html [accessed 7 February 2020]. 
30 Niels Blokker op.cit note 10 at p. 330.  
31 Ibid. 
32 Phillippe Sands Q.C. and Pierre Klein, Bowett’s Law of International Institutions’ 6ed (2009) pp 522-523. 
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 The other issue which constantly comes up is the role of the member states of an IO in as 
far as matters of responsibility for wrongful conduct are concerned. In this thesis, the focus is on 
IOs which have legal personality and therefore have rights and obligations at international law. In 
this regard therefore, the assumption is that it should be a straight forward matter that an IO with 
its own legal personality separate from its member States should be responsible for its own actions 
or omissions. Unfortunately the matter is not so straightforward. As Jan Klabbers notes, IOs are a 
creation of States and sometimes it is not always easy to separate the organization from its member 
states:  ‘[B]ehind the “organizational veil” the contours of the organization’s member states can 
be discerned.”33  
 Weighing in on this matter, Schemers and Blokker note how the NATO veil had been lifted 
in the case concerning the responsibility over military actions carried out against Yugoslavia in 
1999.34 The authors note that despite the fact that NATO is a legal person, when this matter was 
adjudicated upon, both before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the ICJ, it was 
the member states and not NATO itself that had been summoned.35 Further, the authors note that 
there were hardly36 any protests from the concerned member states concerning the fact that the 
correct legal person was not before the Court.37 Both Courts did not make any pronouncements on 
this specific issue. The authors make the following noteworthy observations: 
‘This is a legal vacuum. NATO has both the capacity (as it is a legal person) and the power….to 
carry out military action but cannot itself be held responsible for such action. This implies the need 
for member states to closely stay involved in all relevant decision-making in the organization, as 
they may later be held (co) responsible for its action…’38 
 This relationship between IOs and their Member States in as far as responsibility is 
concerned is sometimes confusing and begs the questions of who is responsible for the wrongs 
committed by IOs? One can only speculate as to what the Court would have stated if the concerned 
States had decided to argue that it was NATO which carried out the military actions and therefore 
                                                          
33 Klabbers, Op. cit note 20.  
34Schemers and Blokker Op.cit note 25 at p. 1010. 
35 Ibid. 
36 With the exception of Canada and France. See the case of Bankovic and Others v Belgium and Others, 
Application No. 5227/99 at para31, 32 and 83 for the arguments made by France. 




NATO should be the one appearing before the Court. There is a possibility that the victims in this 
case would have been left empty handed with no way of seeking redress because NATO is not a 
party both to the ICJ statute and to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and could 
not therefore be a party to these proceedings.  
 In addition to the obstacles as espoused above, the various immunities enjoyed by IOs 
present an even bigger problem in the area of the law concerning the responsibility of IOs.39 
Various reasons have been put forth to justify these immunities including the fact that they aid in 
the independent functioning of IOs.40 While this may be true, immunities also operate to prevent 
individuals from seeking relief before Courts. Recently, however domestic and regional courts 
have begun setting aside the immunity of IOs in an attempt to uphold the rights of those who have 
been wronged by these IOs.41 This has been especially justified in instances where an IO has not 
provided alternative mechanisms for settling disputes.42 However, other IOs such as the UN, enjoy 
absolute immunity and have therefore not been affected by this trend of piercing the immunity 
veil.43 Additionally, in a large majority of cases the immunities of IOs are upheld and therefore, 
victims of wrongful acts committed by these IOs remain without a remedy.  
 The above literature shows that there is a general appreciation that the area of the law 
concerning the responsibility of IOs is far from settled. Indeed, all this literature brings to light 
critical issues concerning the responsibility of IOs. However, in most of this literature the issue of 
the responsibility of IOs is approached from the perspective of IOs. In this thesis, I demonstrate 
the need for greater accountability of IOs by focusing on the plight of those who have been harmed 
by these IOs and the difficulties they face when attempting to seek relief for the wrongful conduct. 
A victim centered approach to IO responsibility can serve as a catalyst to increased efforts for 
finding effective ways of holding IOs accountable.  
 
                                                          
39 See Greta L. Rios and Edward P. Flaherty, ‘International Organisation Reform of Impunity? Immunity is the 
Problem’ (2010) 16 (2) ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law 432. 
40 Bruce C. Rashkow, ‘Immunity of the United Nations: Practices and Challenges,’ (2014) International 
Organisation Law Review, 332. 
41 See Ryngaert, op cit note 16. 
42 Farhana Choudhury, ‘The United Nations Immunity Regime: Seeking a Balance between Unfettered Protection 
and Accountability’ (2016) 104 (725) Georgetown Law Journal 725 at 728. 
43 Georges v UN supra note 13. 
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IV  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This study is primarily based on desktop research. Recourse is had to primary sources of law such 
Treaties, Conventions, other international Instruments, legislation and case law from diverse 
jurisdictions. Recourse will also be had to other sources of the law such as, books, journal articles 
and credible online sources.  
 
V  SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTERS  
 
Chapter one introduces the topic and gives a brief overview of the thesis, addressing such issues 
as the problem statement, methodology and related matters. 
An act is said to be wrongful if there has been a breach of a primary norm or obligation. 
Before looking at the question of responsibility it is therefore important to first of all ascertain the 
primary norms or obligations which are said to have been breached. Identifying the source of 
obligations of IOs is also in some instances a problematic issue. Therefore, the issue of the source 
of obligations of IOs will be discussed in Chapter two. Additionally, the issue of whether IOs are 
bound by human rights obligations will be explored. Finally, the secondary rules of the 
responsibility of IOs will also be discussed. 
In Chapter three the current inadequacies of international law regarding the responsibility 
of IOs will be explored. In this regard an in depth analysis of the legal difficulties faced by 
individuals in seeking redress for wrongs committed by IOs will be conducted. Additionally, 
several cases will be discussed at length in order to clearly demonstrate the short comings of 
international law in the area of the responsibility of IOs.  
In Chapter four, the focus will be on whether in spite of the challenges of immunity (of 
IOs), domestic systems and institutions (particularly the courts) may actually assist in holding IOs 
accountable and thereby assist the individual to obtain relief for wrongful acts. 
Finally, in chapter five a summary of the key findings will be provided. In this Chapter I 










It has been clearly stressed in the previous Chapter that an IO will be responsible for its 
internationally wrongful acts. In accordance with the DARIO, there is an internationally wrongful 
act when the conduct of an IO amounts to a breach of an international obligation and further when 
such conduct can be is attributed to the IO.44 The breach of obligations and the attribution of 
wrongful conduct, therefore form the bedrock of the responsibility of IOs at international law.45  
It must be stated at this point that the DARIO were developed by the International Law 
Commission (ILC) for the purpose of addressing the question of the responsibility of IOs for 
internationally wrongful acts. However unlike the Draft Articles on State Responsibility (DASR)46 
which have been considered a restatement of customary law,47 the DARIO have not been so 
warmly received. Among the many criticisms of the DARIO is the fact that they are based on 
insufficient practice and that it is pointless to develop secondary rules of responsibility when the 
primary rules are unclear.48  
 A discussion on the difficulties of seeking redress for wrongs committed by IOs would be 
incomplete without an appreciation of both the secondary rules of responsibility and the primary 
norms consisting the obligations of IOs. It must be stated that primary and secondary norms are 
vast areas of the law in their own right. It is therefore not the intention of this author to conduct an 
                                                          
44 Article 4 (a) and (b) of the DARIO. 
45There must of course also be a lack of any of the justifications for the wrongful conduct as provided for in Articles 
20-25 of the DARIO. 
46 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol II, Part 2. 
47  The ICJ gave its nod to the use of the DASR, stating the provisions as reflective of customary law in the 
Genocide Case (Bosnia-Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro (2007) ICJ Reports 43. Additionally, provisions of 
the DASR have been referred to widely in various judicial forums. See for instance Armed activities on the Territory 
of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v Uganda) (2005) ICJ Reports 168 para 160, Prosecutor v Tadic, 
(1999) 38 ILM 1518 para 145, Lozidou v Turkey, 40/1993/435/514, Council of Europe: European Court of Human 
Rights, 23 February 1995, available at https://www.refworld.org/cases,ECHR,402a07c94.html [accessed 7 February 
2020]. See also TW Bennet & J. Strug and James Crawford, Supra note 8. 
 
48 See for instance Jose E. Alavares ‘ Book Review of International Organizations and their Exercise f Sovereign 
Powers by Dan Sarooshi’ (2007) 3 American Journal of International Law, 674 at p. 676-677. 
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exhaustive discussion on these two areas of the law for such a feat would be outside the scope of 
this thesis. The intention rather, is to conduct an overview of the source of obligations for IOs and 
the secondary rules of responsibility in order to aid a better appreciation of the difficulties of 
seeking redress for wrongful acts committed by these IOs.  
The prevailing argument throughout this Chapter is that some of the problems in seeking 
redress can be traced to the lack of clarity of the primary norms and some problematic issues 
associated with the secondary norms. In section II therefore, the general principles of responsibility 
of IOs with a particular focus on the DARIO will be discussed. Additionally, problematic issues 
concerning these secondary rules will be examined. The lack of clarity on the source of obligations 
of IOs poses quite a significant problem in the responsibility of IOs.49 Admittedly, it is quite a 
difficult task to hold an IO responsible for an alleged wrongful act when it is not clear whether that 
wrongful act constitutes breach of an obligation which is binding on an IO. In section III therefore 
the complex subject of the source of obligations binding IOs will be examined. Further, an 
examination of whether IOs are bound by human rights obligations will be conducted. Section IV 
will conclude this chapter. 
 
II GENERAL PRINCIPLES ON THE RESPONSIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS 
 
The DARIO are an almost compulsory starting point on any discussion concerning the 
responsibility of IOs. The DARIO were adopted by the ILC at its 63rd session in 2011.50Generally, 
reception towards the DARIO has been mixed. As was alluded to in the introduction, the lack of 
sufficient practice seems to be a major issue.51 Commenting on specific Articles, one author 
observed as follows: 
                                                          
49 For instance see Kristina Daurgidas, ‘How and Why International Law Binds International Organisations’ (2016) 
57 (2) Harvard International Law Journal 325 at p. 326 -327 where the author observes the lack of certainty and the 
significant disagreement which exists on the international law norms binding on IOs. 
50 Supra note 6. The actual work of drafting the DARIO commenced in 2001. 
51See Daphne Shraga, ‘The ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations: The Interplay 
between the Practice and the Role’ (2011) 105 American Society of International Law Proceedings, 351 at p. 353. 
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‘Article 8...Article 14…and Article 15… have one thing in common. None of them is supported by 
Practice, nor is it likely, for reasons inherent in the institutional structure and political nature of the 
UN, that practice will emerge in support of the rule.’52  
Briefly, Article 8 of the DARIO provides that an IO is bound by the actions of its organ or 
agent even if those actions are ultra vires or contrary to instructions. Article 14 makes provision 
for the liability of an IO if it aids a State or another IO in the commission of an internationally 
wrongful act. Similarly, in accordance with Article 15, an IO will be responsible for an 
internationally wrongful act if it controls or directs a State or another IO to commit such a wrongful 
act. 
Despite these criticisms53 however, other authors contend that all is not lost. For instance 
Daurgidas states: 
‘…the IO Responsibility Articles are neither premature nor feckless. On the contrary, the IO 
Responsibility Articles can help clarify the primary norms that bind IOs. There are reasons to think 
that the IO Responsibility Articles will spur IOs and their member states to prevent violations and 
to address violations promptly if they occur.’54 
It is debatable whether nine years after being adopted by the ILC, the DARIO have actually 
assisted in clarifying the primary norms binding IOs. It is true however that the DARIO have filled 
a gap created by the lack of formal rules regulating the responsibility of IOs. Therefore, in the 
absence of any other rules regulating the responsibility of IOs, resort may be had to the DARIO.  
Additionally, several judicial bodies have made decisions based on these Articles. Notable 
cases include the The State v Hasan Nuhanovic55 in which the Dutch Supreme Court relied on 
Articles 7 and 48 of the DARIO to confirm the Appellate Court finding of attributing wrongful 
conduct to the UN (in principle) and to the Netherlands government.56 Similarly in The State of 
                                                          
52 Ibid, p. 352. 
53 See Ahlborn op cit note 9 at pp 398-403 in which the author criticizes the indecisive and inconsistent use of the 
phrase “Rules of the Organisation,” and Allain Pellet ‘International Organizations are Definitely not States. Cursory 
Remarks on the ILC Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations in Maurizio Ragazzi(ed) 
Responsibility of International Organizations: Essays in Memory of Sir Ian Brownlie (2013). 
54 Kristina Daurgidas ‘Reputation and the Responsibility of International Organizations’ (2015) 25(4) European 
Journal of International Law, 991 at p. 993. 
55 Case No 12/03324 (6 Sept, 2013). 
56 See paras 3.9.2-3.9.4 and para 3.11.2. 
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Netherlands v Mothers of Srebrenica57 and Al-Jeddah v United Kingdom58 similar references to 
the DARIO were made. There is some evidence therefore of the growing influence of DARIO, 
although this has been at a rather slow pace. This section will discuss the major aspects of the 
secondary rules of responsibility of international organizations. 
 
(a) Legal Personality 
 
Article 2(a) of DARIO defines an IO as ’…an organ established by a treaty or other instrument 
governed by international law and possessing its own international legal personality….’ The 
possession of an international legal personality is critical not only in the discharge of duties of an 
IO but also in the organisation’s effective participation in the international legal order. The 
possession of an international legal personality means an IO is capable of ‘…bearing rights and 
duties and capable of maintaining and enforcing its rights...’59 in the same manner as other subjects 
of international law such as States. An IO is of course not a State and therefore its rights may be 
limited in some aspects. In the Reparations Case,60 the Court observed as follows: 
‘….whereas a State possesses the totality of international rights…the rights and duties of an entity 
such as the organization must depend upon the purpose and functions as specified or implied in its 
constituent documents and developed in practice.’61 
This difference between States and International Organizations was further emphasized by the ICJ as 
follows: 
‘International Organizations are subjects of international law which do not, unlike States, possess 
a general competence. International Organizations are governed by the “principle of speciality’, 
that is to say, they are invested, by the States which create them, with powers, the limits of which 
are a function of the common interests whose promotion those States entrust to them”62 
                                                          
57 Case Number 17/04567 (19 July, 2019) at paras 11.2 and 15.2. 
58  ECtHR, Application Number 27021//08 at para 56 and 84.  
59 Reparations Case supra note 2. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. p. 180. 
62 Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion. [1996] ICJ Reports, 66 at 
pp78-79, para 25. 
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Another criticism of the DARIO, is the fact that these Articles do not give sufficient effect 
to the principle of speciality.63 In other words the DARIO treat IOs almost the same as States in 
that the regime of  responsibility for IOs is strikingly similar to that of States. This perhaps results 
from the fact that the DARIO are almost entirely based on the DASR.64  
For purposes of this thesis however, the possession of legal personality is an important first 
step in triggering the responsibility of an IO. Victims of wrongful acts have an opportunity to seek 
and demand redress from the IO as a subject of international law in its own right. IOs which do 
not have international legal personality are in a different category. Liability for their wrongful acts 
remains the responsibility of the Member States constituting such Organisations.65 As previously 
indicated, in this thesis, the focus is on IOs possessing legal personality.  
The constitutive documents of an IO will have express provisions indicating the IO’s legal 
status. However, for those that do not have such provisions, recourse will be had to the 
responsibilities and duties of such an organisation. If the performance of these duties cannot be 
successfully done without the possession of legal personality, then by implication, the intention of 
the Member States must have been that the IO should have legal personality.66 Additionally, this 
international legal personality status can be claimed against non-member States of the IO if the IO 
has a universal character such as the UN.67 However for those organizations which do not possess 
this universal character, this international legal personality status is only as regards its member 
states or to those states which have explicitly or implicitly recognized them.68  
 
(b) The Principle of Attribution 
 
As noted earlier, there is an internationally wrongful act of an IO if there is breach of an 
international obligation and this breach can be attributed to the IO. The topic concerning 
obligations of IOs will be considered in Section III below. This section will consider the critical 
                                                          
63 Allan Pellet op cit note 53 at p. 46. 
64 See sentiments expressed by Hennie Strydom (ed) International Law (2016) at p. 150. 
65 White op cit note 26 p. 220. 
66 Reparations Case Supra note 2 at p.179.  
67 Ibid.  
68 Schermers & Blokker op cit note 27 at pp 990-991.  
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component of attributing a wrongful act to an IO. As Antonio Tzanakopoulos notes, States and 
IOs are fictional beings which cannot act in the physical world.69 The conduct of these fictional 
beings is always through natural persons. In this sense, attribution plays the role of a bridge, 
connecting the actions of the natural person to an international law subject.70 
Chapter II of the DARIO deals with the subject of attribution. In accordance with Article 
6, an IO is responsible for the conduct of its organs or agents, irrespective of the position of the 
agent or organ in the organisation. Additionally an IO will be responsible for the wrongful conduct 
of a State or another IO if it exercises effective control over that State or the IO.71 Furthermore an 
IO will be responsible for the conduct of its agents even if that conduct is ultra vires.72 Finally, an 
IO will be responsible for conduct which it adopts and acknowledges as its own even if such 
conduct is not attributable to an IO under Articles 6-8.73 
(i) The Effective Control Test 
 
In general terms, Articles 6, 8 and 9 of the DARIO have not been very contentious.74 Controversy 
has however arisen concerning Article 7. This is especially so with regard to peace keeping 
operations or military operations. Berenice Boutin describes military operations as ‘operations 
involving the use of military force, undertaken by the armed forces of more than one State under 
the lead of an IO.’75 Much of the controversy of Article 7 concerns the ‘effective control’ test for 
attributing conduct to an IO. This effective control test is not to be confused with the effective 
control test for attributing the conduct of paramilitary organizations to a State under the DASR.76 
                                                          
69 Antonious Tzanakopolous ‘Attibution of Conduct to International Organizations in Peace Keeping Operations’ 
available at http://ejiltalk.org/attribution-of-conduct-to-international-organisations-in peacekeeping-operations/ 
accessed on 10/09/2019.    
70 Ibid. 
71 Article 7. 
72 Article 8. 
73 Article 9. See for instance the case of Prosecutor v Dragan Nikolic ICTY Trial Chamber II Case Number IT-94-2-
S (18 December, 2003) where the Court attributed the treatment and arrest of the accused person to the Stabilisation 
Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR) because SFORs conduct displayed that it had approved and adopted the 
acts.   
74 Although see Shraga op-cit note 51 and 52 for criticisms on Article 8 of the DARIO. 
75 Berenice Boutin, ‘Attribution of Conduct in International Military Operations: A Causal Analysis of Effective 
Control’ (2017) 18 Melbourne Journal of International Law 153 at p. 157. 
76 See Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v USA) (1986) 
ICJ Rep14, para 115-116 for a description of this test in the realm of State Responsibility. See also Commentary to 
Article 7 of DARIO. 
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The effective control test for attributing conduct to an IO has generally been accepted. The 
continued application of this test by several judicial forums is evidence of this acceptance.77 
Despite this general acceptance however, several issues need to be highlighted. Firstly, as 
regarding peace-keeping and other military operations, it must be stated that it is sometimes not 
easy to determine who is exercising effective control over peace keeping troops and operations. 
The multiple stakeholders involved and therefore the complex scenario presented in the facts of 
the joined cases of Behrami and Saramati78 is a perfect illustration of this problem. There is often 
a shifting of blame between Member States and IOs (particularly the UN) as to who is responsible 
for wrongful acts committed in the process of peace keeping and military operations, to the 
detriment of those trying to seek redress for these wrongful acts79 
More importantly however, the effective control test’s actual outline and modalities are not 
very clear. This has resulted in different thoughts and opinions on how the test should be applied 
and interpreted.80 Notably, as will be discussed shortly, there have also been variations in the 
manner in which the test has been interpreted and applied judicially. It must be stated that these 
different interpretations and approaches have had and will continue having a bearing on the rights 
of those seeking redress for wrongful acts in peacekeeping and similar operations. For instance in 
the Nuhanovic81 case, the District Court used the Presumptive interpretation to find that 
Netherlands was not responsible for the massacre at Srebrenica.82 The Presumptive interpretation 
approach is to the effect that if forces in a peacekeeping operation are under the control of the UN, 
the presumption is that their conduct will be attributable to the UN.83 This presumption is rebutted 
                                                          
77 See for instance Al Jeddah supra note 58 (para 84) the Court used the effective control test and so have the Dutch 
Courts in Mothers of Srebrenica and Nuhanovic (Appellate Court) (para 5.9).   
78 Joined cases of Behrami v France and Saramati v France, Germany and Norway, supra note 12. See also the Al-
Jeddah Case supra note 58. 
79 See detailed discussions in Chapter 3 on how the relationship between IOs and their Member States affects the 
question of responsibility and prejudices victims. 
80 See generally Yohei Okada ‘ Effective Control Test at the Interface between the Law of International Responsibility 
and the Law of International Organizations: Managing Concerns over the Attribution of UN Peacekeepers’ Conduct 
to Troop Contributing Nations’  (2019) 13 (2) Leiden Journal of International Law 1. 
81 Judgment of the District Court, Case Number 265615/HA ZA, paras. 4.14.1-4.14.5. See also the Belgian Case of 
Mukeshimana-Ngulinzira v. Belgian State, Judgment of the Court of First Instance, Case Numbers 04/4807/A and 
07/15547/A. 
82 Nuhanovic supra note 81 at paras 4.14.1-4.14.5. 
83 See Okada, op cit note 80 at p.2. 
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however, where it can be demonstrated that troops were actually acting under the direct control of 
their home State.84  
On the other hand, others argue for a ‘preventive’ interpretation of the effective control 
test.85 According to this approach, effective control should mean “control most likely to be 
effective in preventing the wrong in question.” 86 A greater leeway should be allowed for 
attributing the conduct of peacekeepers to Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) as this would be 
most effective in preventing violations. This approach is also aimed at enabling victims to avoid 
the hurdle of UN immunity before domestic courts and thus aids the obtaining of remedies from 
TCNs.87 The preventive approach was used by the appellate court in Nuhanovic88  and also by the 
District Court in the Srebrenica Case.89 
While the preventive approach would certainly be applauded by victims of wrongful acts, 
it has been criticised for unfairly allocating responsibility. Okada notes that ‘…manipulating the 
effective control test as a tool exclusively for remedies with no regard to its institutional aspect 
seems unjustifiable.’90 It has also been argued that putting too much responsibility on TCNs would 
serve to destabilize the peace keeping regime in two ways: TCNs would either choose not to send 
troops or would seek to have greater control over peace keeping operations in order to minimize 
liability.91 Viewed from this angle, the presumptive interpretation would seem a fair way of 
interpreting the effective control test. The UN should be responsible for violations occurring under 
its control and TCNs should be responsible for violations occurring under their control. It would 
seem unfair to disproportionally put all the responsibility of wrongs committed on the TCNs.  
However as is common knowledge, the UN cannot be compelled to accept liability either 
by a domestic or international court or tribunal because of the various immunities it enjoys. 
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Therefore even if certain wrongful actions are attributed to the UN, victims cannot seek reparation 
unless the UN of its own volition accepts liability and makes the necessary reparations.92 Therefore 
while fairly allocating responsibility, the presumptive interpretation does not adequately address 
the problem of jurisdictional immunity of the UN. Victims are left at the mercy of the UN’s 
determinations on whether or not to accept responsibility when wrongful acts have been attributed 
to it. Where the UN does not accept responsibility, the victim is left empty handed. 
In this regard, although the preventive approach lets the UN abscond its responsibilities for 
wrongful conduct, a victim centered approach would clearly favour this interpretation. Perhaps its 
application would indeed minimize violations. Perhaps the fact that TCNs become reluctant to 
send troops for fear of liability would be the necessary catalyst for serious thoughts and 
considerations on effective ways of addressing wrongful acts committed in peace keeping and 
similar operations.  
As noted earlier, attribution is only one element of an internationally wrongful act. The 
other important aspect is that there should breach of an international obligation. What is the source 
of the obligations of IOs? 
 
III AN OVERVIEW OF THE PRIMARY NORMS 
 
While the secondary rules of responsibility address the matter of responsibility for wrongful acts, 
primary rules of international law address the question of which conduct is or is not wrongful in 
the first place.93 The international law arena is primarily designed for states and therefore as 
Schemers and Blokker note, the majority of primary rules of international law do not apply to 
IOs.94  
Article 11 of the DARIO states that an act of an IO will only constitute a breach of an 
international obligation if the organisation was bound by that obligation. This begs the 
fundamental question of which obligations bind IOs? The need for clarity on the primary norms 
                                                          
92 See Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion on Dispute Settlement mechanisms and immunities of IOs concerning 
International Organisations. 
93 See DASR, Commentaries, General Commentary, para 1. 
94 Schemers and Blokker op cit note 25 para 1572. 
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binding IOs has become greater with the growing influence of these bodies and their impact on the 
lives of individuals. Lack of clarity on primary norms affects the question of responsibility since 
it is not clear whether alleged international wrongs constitute a breach of an obligation binding on 
an IO.95 This section therefore critically examines the obligations which bind IOs, including the 
important question of whether IOs are bound by human rights. 
 
(a) Obligations of International Organizations 
 
The following observations by the ICJ provide a great starting point in considering the source of 
obligations binding IOs:  
‘International Organizations are subjects of international law and, as such, are bound by any 
obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of international law, under their constitutions 
or under international agreements to which they are parties.’96  
It is perhaps fairly obvious that an IO would be bound by obligations arising from its 
constitution or constitutive documents. Additionally by virtue of being international legal persons, 
IOs have the ability and capacity to enter into agreements whether at the international or domestic 
level. Obligations arising from these agreements would also therefore be binding on an IO. The 
1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organisations 
and Between International Organisations97 provides rules which regulate international agreements 
concerning IOs. This Treaty is however not yet in force.98 It must be noted that most Treaties in 
existence currently, do not allow for IOs to become parties.  
                                                          
95 See Andre Nollkaemper and Dov Jacobs, ‘Shared Responsibilty in International Law: A Conceptual Framework’ 
(2013) 34 (2) Michigan Journal of International Law 359 at pp 408-412 for discussions on not only the lack of 
clarity on primary norms but the sometimes problematic distinction between primary and secondary norms. This 
lack of clarity also affects state responsibility, see also James Crawford ‘The ILC’s Articles for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts: A Retrospect’ (2002) 96 American Journal on International Law 874 at pp 876-877. 
96 Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, [1980] ICJ Reports 73 at pp 89-
90. 
97Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International 
Organizations., 16 December 1982, A/RES/37/112, available at: 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f0158.html [accessed 8 February 2020]. 
98 Currently 33 of the required 35 States have ratified the Convention. See 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII-3&chapter=23&clang=_en 
accessed on 3/2/2020. 
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Article 38 (1) (c) of the Statute of the ICJ99 identifies the ‘general principles of international 
law’ as a source of law. It may be argued that by virtue of being subjects of international law, IOs 
are bound by general principles of international law in the same manner as States would be bound. 
In this regard, it has been argued that IOs are bound by the provisions of ‘law-making treaties‘-by 
virtue of the universality of the application of such treaties.100 The following observations have 
been made: 
‘The legal foundation of this obligation lies not in its character as an international treaty but rather 
in its character as a general principle of law codified by treaty. Whether a particular Treaty contains 
such a general principle may be indicated in its mode of establishment. The number of States which 
participated in its drafting is important, and also whether the text has been unanimously –or almost 
unanimously-adopted.101 
 Other factors to consider in ascertaining whether a particular treaty codifies general 
principles of law include the length of time in which the treaty has remained open for ratification 
and the number of ratifications collected.102 Schemers and Blokker are suggesting here that IOs 
can be bound by provisions of a Treaty even when they are not parties to those treaties. The African 
Court on Human and Peoples Rights (AfCHPR) disagrees. In Femi Falana v African Union,103 the 
AfCHPR stated that obligations emanating from a treaty cannot be forced on an IO which is not a 
party to that treaty. The Court therefore dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction since the AU 
did not consent to being bound by the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s 
Rights.104 
It has further been argued that, IOs are bound by the same general principles of law which 
bind the States which created them.105 For instance regional organisations may be bound by general 
principles of law as apply within that specific region. The understanding here is that different 
                                                          
99 United Nations, Statute of the International Court of Justice, 18 April 1946, available at: 
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regions have general principles of law applicable and peculiar to that particular region. In making 
this argument it must be considered however that in such regional organisations as the African 
Union, a mixture of the lingering effects of colonisation and various cultures across the continent 
has resulted into vastly different legal systems. In this context legal systems of Sub-regional 
Organisations would probably have more similarities. However grounding the obligations of IOs 
in general principles of international law encounters some problems as discussed below.106 
 
(b) Are International Organisations Bound by Human Rights Obligations? 
 
The main bone of contention concerning the primary norms is the question whether and to what 
extent are IOs bound by human rights. The growing influence and activities of IOs have also 
translated into a greater impact on the human rights of individuals. Examples of human rights 
violations perpetrated by IOs abound to such an extent that some IOs are considered a risk to 
fundamental rights.107 For instance reference has been made to the sanctions regime of the Security 
Council and its impact on the human rights of individuals.108 Additionally reports of human rights 
violations in peace keeping and other operations have been well documented.109 The UN itself is 
acutely aware of the various violations which occur in peacekeeping operations.110 These reported 
human rights violations by the UN are quite concerning, when regard is had to the fact that the 
                                                          
106 See notes 117 -119 and accompanying text. 
107 Bogdandy op cit note 11 at p. 68. 
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promotion and protection of human rights is among the fundamental principles of the UN 
Charter.111 
However while IOs  are capable of violating human rights just as much States, it is easier 
to hold States accountable for human rights violations than it is to hold IOs accountable. A major 
part of this problem is the fact that unlike States, IOs are not parties to human rights treaties. These 
treaties are a major source of the primary rules or norms concerning human rights. Therefore, the 
basis upon which IOs are bound by human rights obligations has to be identified elsewhere, outside 
these human rights treaties.  
Several arguments for binding IOs to human rights obligations outside treaty law have been 
made. For instance it has been argued that some human rights have acquired the status of 
customary international law and that therefore by virtue of being subjects of international law, IOs 
are bound by these customary law status human rights.112 However grounding human rights in 
customary international law faces some problems. To begin with it cannot be definitively argued 
that all the existing human rights have attained the status of customary law. In order to successfully 
establish a norm of customary law, it must be shown that there is consistent State practice coupled 
with a belief that the State practice is obligatory.113 As Olivier De Schutter notes, in practice States 
tend to favour some human rights over others and that therefore in this regard there is lack of 
uniformity both in State practice and in perceptions about human rights.114 
De Schutter suggests instead that it would be safer to ground human rights in general 
principles of law.115 This approach seems to have the nod of the ICJ as per the sentiments expressed 
in the WHO and Egypt Agreement.116 However other commentators are not so certain that this 
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pronouncement by the ICJ puts this matter to rest.117 For instance Klabbers has stated that despite 
the sentiments by the ICJ, it is not clear which particular principles of international law and why 
those principles would bind IOs.118 Daurgidas concurs and observes that: 
WHO-EGYPT…fails to resolve which international law rule binds IOs, and the question remains 
unsettled. But even if there were agreement about which rules bind IOs, scholars have disagreed 
whether those rules are mandatory or default rules.119 
In the final analysis therefore the theory that the human rights obligations of IOs are grounded in 
general principles of international law is far from settled. 
Noelle Quenivet on the other hand suggests other ways in which organisations such as the 
UN can be bound by human rights obligations.120 These suggestions may equally apply to other 
IOs. It is suggested that the UN could formally declare that it is bound by specified human rights 
treaties or secondly that some of its bodies could be subjected to treaty implementing and 
monitoring mechanisms.121 The first suggestion is based in part on the fact that the internal law of 
the UN (Codes of Conduct, Staff Regulations and UN Reports among others) has professed 
adherence to human rights standards.122 As regards the second suggestion, Quenivet cites an 
instance where the United Nations Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) submitted reports 
to the Human Rights Committee on the status of human rights in Kosovo.123  
 Both of these suggestions require the UN or the relevant IOs to voluntarily take steps to be 
bound by human rights standards as specified in treaties. It is of course doubtful whether 
organisations such as the UN would voluntarily take these steps. Until such a time as decisive steps 
are taken to meaningfully hold IOs to human rights standards, victims will continue to bear the 
brunt of the uncertainty caused by a lack of clarity on the primary rules binding on IOs. As others 
have rightly observed, the problem is compounded by a lack of an appropriate forum which could 
                                                          
117 Daurgidas Op cit note 49 at pp 331-335. 
118 Jan Klabbers, ‘The Paradox of International Law’ (2008) International Organisations Law Review 151 at p. 165. 
119 Daurgidas op cit note 49 at p. 334. 
120 Quenivent note 21 pp 608-621. 
121 Ibid. 
122 See Staff Regulations, UN Doc ST/SGB/2003/5 and UN Secretary General, ‘In Larger Freedom: Towards 
Development, Security and Human Rights for all’ UN DOC. A/59/2005 p.113. 
123 Quenivent note 21 at p.614. See Report on the Human Rights Situation in Kosovo since 1999, United Nations 




decisively make a pronouncement on the question of whether IOs are bound by human rights 
obligations.124  
The following thoughts would seem a fitting conclusion to this matter: 
‘…the lack of clearly identified sources of international law works to the detriment of legal 
certainty and individuals whose rights have been violated. In an era where a victim-centered 
approach is cherished, it cannot be accepted that an entity, especially as powerful as the United 
Nations, can simply be freed of any human rights obligations. Indeed, as a result of the current legal 
position, victims may not even find a forum that can readily address human rights violations they 
have suffered at the hands of the United Nations, since it is impossible to point to the sources of 
such human rights obligations.’125 
    
IV CONCLUSION 
 
The uncertainty which persists in certain aspects of secondary rules and generally in the primary 
rules is perhaps a characteristic feature of international law. These uncertainties do not help the 
cause of those who are trying to seek redress for wrongful acts committed by IOs. While the 
development of the DARIO gives some guidance as to the secondary rules of responsibility, there 
is still a long way to go. The path of the person who seeks redress for wrongful acts committed by 
IOs is a difficult one with hurdles at every turn. It seems rather ironic that some of these IOs are 
in the forefront of promoting human rights and yet are themselves not effectively held accountable 
for breaching the same human rights which they promote.  
In addition to the problems discussed in this chapter, there are other obstacles which those 
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THE DIFFICULTIES OF SEEKING REDRESS FOR WRONGFUL ACTS COMMITED 
BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 
 
I  INTRODUCTION 
 
Beyond the problems associated with the primary and secondary rules as discussed in the 
preceding chapter, individuals seeking redress for wrongful IO conduct face various other hurdles. 
Some of the major obstacles include lack of appropriate dispute resolution mechanisms and the 
immunities enjoyed by IOs.126  
A further issue worth pointing out is how the relationship between an IO and its member 
states affects the question of responsibility over wrongful acts. In some instances it becomes 
unclear who (between the IO and its Member States) is responsible or should bear responsibility 
for wrongful acts.127 This is particularly true in situations such as peacekeeping or military 
operations. 
 In this Chapter the further inadequacies of international law in the area of IO responsibility 
will be discussed. To begin with, section II, explores how the relationship of an IO and the IO’s 
member states affects the question of responsibility. The focus in this section is on how the 
uncertainties which exist in particular instances, on who bears responsibility for wrongful conduct, 
prejudices the victims of that wrongful conduct.  
The importance of the availability and effectiveness of dispute handling mechanisms 
concerning complaints against IOs cannot be overemphasised. Therefore, in section III, an 
assessment of the currently available dispute settlement mechanisms for complaints against IOs is 
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conducted. Additionally, this section also explores other problems concerning dispute settlement 
in the law of international organisations generally.  
The various immunities which IOs enjoy are important for the proper functioning of these 
organisations. However these immunities also present a significant challenge for individuals 
seeking redress for IO wrongful conduct. Section IV therefore focuses on how IO immunity affects 
the question of responsibility and also examines the conflict between immunity and access to 
justice. 
 
II INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND THEIR MEMBER STATES: A CASE 
OF SHIFTING BLAME? 
  
The relationship between an IO and its Member States is an important one. Blokker refers to it as 
an ‘existential one.’128  IOs come into existence at the behest of States and can therefore cease to 
exist if the Member States so decide; as the disbanding of the League of Nations ably 
demonstrates.129 On the other hand, IOs help States to achieve goals and purposes which would 
otherwise be difficult to achieve if States were acting singularly. Such purposes include peace 
keeping missions, efforts in combating terrorism and the work carried out by the World Health 
Organisation in the management of plagues and other health issues of global concern, among 
others. 
 The possession of an international legal personality aids the activities and functions of IOs 
both on their own behalf and on behalf of States. In the realm of responsibility, this legal 
personality also pre-supposes that IOs will be responsible for their own wrongful acts. After all 
Article 3 of the DARIO is very clear: ‘Every internationally wrongful act of an International 
Organisation entails the international responsibility of that organization.” It is not only logical, it 
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is also a legal principle that an entity which possesses a legal personality should be responsible for 
its own wrongful acts.  
Despite the provisions of Article 3 however, in some instances the relationship between 
Member States and IOs affects the question of responsibility. In fact the allocation of responsibility 
for wrongful conduct between an IO and the IOs member states is considered one of the most 
difficult areas in the law of IOs.130   
Opinions and thoughts on the responsibility of States for wrongful acts committed by IOs 
are varied. There are those who believe that IOs should be responsible for their own wrongful 
acts.131 The argument is that, allowing States to be responsible for the wrongdoings of IOs 
undermines and therefore defeats the whole purpose of the separate legal personality of IOs.132 It 
is further argued that allowing States to be responsible for wrongful acts committed by IOs would 
result in those States seeking to have greater control over the affairs of the IO and therefore serve 
to undermine the organisation’s independence.133 
On the other hand, there are those who believe that since seeking redress from an IO is 
usually complicated, redress for wrongful acts should instead be obtained from the Member States 
of the IO.134 Proponents of this view argue that, sometimes States hide behind an organisation 
which they have created in a bid to avoid responsibility for actions which are purportedly 
committed by the organisation but which are in essence acts of the Member States.135In this case 
therefore, holding Member States responsible for the wrongdoings of IOs in specified 
circumstances is not only desirable, it is lawful.136  
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Finally, some argue that responsibility for wrongful acts especially in peacekeeping 
operations should be shared between the IO and the concerned Member States in accordance with 
the entity exercising effective control over the perpetrators of the wrongful act.137 Proponents of 
this view argue that, each entity should bear responsibility for its own wrongful conduct and that 
effective modes of dispute settlement for IOs (UN specifically) should be developed instead of 
punishing TCNs with responsibility over wrongful acts committed by IOs. 138 
The intricate details of the complex relationship between an IO and its Member States and 
therefore how responsibility should be apportioned were discussed to some extent in Chapter 2. 
Building on those discussions, this Chapter aims at highlighting the fact that the uncertainty of 
where to apportion blame and therefore responsibility, when an IO has committed wrongful acts 
is prejudicial to those trying to seek relief for wrongful acts. In some instances this uncertainty and 
blame shifting between an IO and its Member States results in leaving victims empty handed. 
 
(a) An Illustration of the Problem  
  
The merged cases of Behrami and Behrami v France and Saramati v France, Germany and 
Norway139 are a perfect illustration of the plight of victims when both IOs and Member States shift 
blame and refuse to accept responsibility. In Behrami, the case concerned a child who had been 
killed and his brother who had been seriously injured, when an undetonated cluster bomb they had 
been playing with exploded.140 The bomb had been dropped during the NATO air strikes in Kosovo 
in 1999.   
 The area in which the bomb exploded was at that time under the control of a multi-national 
Brigade (MNB) led by France. However, France refused to accept responsibility for the incident 
on the basis that at the time of the explosion de-mining processes had been taken over by the 
Kosovo Force (KFOR) pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1244.141 For its part, the United Nations, 
                                                          
137 Okada. Op cit note 78 p.6 
138 Okada op cit note 78 p. 12. 
139 Supra note 12 
140 Behrami supra note 12 para 5. 
141 ibid para 7. See Resolution S/R/1244 (10 June 1999) which authorised the deployment of military and civilian 
personnel to assist in resolving the conflict in Kosovo. 
37 
 
also refused to accept responsibility, pushing the blame to another entity.142 Interestingly, the IO 
(NATO) which had been responsible for dropping these bombs in the first place did not feature 
anywhere in this case and was never held responsible or accountable for its actions. This can 
perhaps be attributed to the difficulties of bringing a complaint against NATO. In which possible 
forum would a claim against NATO be brought?143  
 In the final analysis, the Court found that the de mining processes were the responsibility 
of UNMIK, a subsidiary organ of the UN.144 In essence therefore, the wrongful acts were 
attributable to the UN.145 The Applicant however was left empty handed because the UN is not a 
party to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and therefore could not be held liable 
under that Convention.146  
The finding of the Court in the Behrami case also applied to the Saramati case.  In the 
latter case the applicant had been arrested by UNMIK police in an area controlled by an MNB led 
by Germany.147 Additionally Mr. Saramati’s further detention had been ordered (at different times) 
by Norwegian and French Commanding Officers. The detention was however adjudged unlawful 
and Mr. Saramati was released from custody.148 The Court found that in arresting and ordering the 
further detention of the Applicant, the concerned officials had been exercising ‘lawfully delegated 
Chapter VII powers of the UNSC’.149 The unlawful detention therefore could be attributed to the 
UN.150 Similarly, Mr. Saramati was left empty handed. 
The joined cases of Behrami and Saramati have of course been criticized for several 
reasons,151 including the fact that the Court failed to recognize that States can also be responsible 
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for the wrongful conduct of their troops.152 From the perspective of the victims however, the fact 
remains that the Applicants had suffered harm but they could not seek redress as a result of a 
decision or perhaps lack of appropriate decision on who was responsible for that harm. There were 
of course other factors at play in both cases, however the decision of where to apportion blame 
remains a significant issue.   
On the other hand in Al-Jeddah v. United Kingdom,153 the applicant had been arrested and 
held in detention at a facility which was under the control of the British Army in Iraq.154 The basis 
of the arrest was that the Applicant had been involved in terrorist activities and was therefore a 
security threat.155 At the time of the Applicant’s arrest, there was a Multi-National Force (MNF) 
in Iraq which had not been created by a UNSC resolution but was all the same authorized, by a 
UNSC resolution,156 to carry out various activities related to the maintenance of security in Iraq. 
The United Kingdom (UK) was part of this MNF. Distinguishing the facts of this case from the 
facts in Behrami (rather unconvincingly), the ECtHR held that the unlawful detention of the 
Applicant was attributable to the United Kingdom and not to the UN.157 
The positive aspect of Al-Jeddah is that the wronged individual in this case did not leave 
empty handed as the Court did order the UK to compensate the Applicant for the unlawful 
detention.158 However lingering questions remain as to the role and therefore the responsibility of 
the UN in this case. Although the finding of the Court is supported under the ECHR in accordance 
with obligations of States under that Convention,159 one gets the sense that the Court was trying to 
undo the perceived injustice occasioned in Behrami. Indeed it can reasonably be argued that the 
inherent difficulties of holding the UN responsible for the impugned act and therefore what this 
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would mean for the victim, were at the back of the Court’s mind. The UK, it seems was an easier 
entity to hold responsible for the unlawful detention of the Applicant. 
Finally, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands decision160 pertaining to the well-known 
events at Srebrenica, delivered on 19 July, 2019 brings to a close one of the most extensively 
litigated cases concerning the question of responsibility in peace keeping operations. In the final 
analysis, the Court held that, Netherlands was only liable for ten percent of the damage suffered 
by the relatives of those massacred at the hands of the Bosnian Serbs in KOSOVO.161 The 
responsibility of Netherlands stemmed from the fact that the Dutch Battalion did not offer the male 
refugees in the compound at Srebrenica a choice to stay within the compound and so possibly 
escape from the Bosnian Serbs.162 The Court did not explicitly state that a large aspect of the 
wrongful deaths was attributable to the UN but the inference is clear when the Court states that 
Netherlands cannot be held responsible for acts carried out ‘under the command and control of the 
UN’.163 It has been argued that holding TCNs liable for wrongful conduct in peace keeping 
operations as was the case in Mothers of Srebrenica, especially in the Supreme Court, is the 
exception rather than the norm.164 In this particular case, holding Netherlands responsible was only 
possible because of the presence of exceptional circumstances, specifically the role played by the 
Dutch Battalion in not offering the male refugees the choice to stay within the compound.    
These cases are illustrative of how the interplay between IOs and their Member States 
affects the question of responsibility. Above all, the cases illustrate the plight of victims, when 
courts are faced with the sometimes difficult task of deciding where responsibility should fall. IOs 
and mostly the UN are not held responsible for the wrongful acts and omissions instigated under 
their control, sometimes leaving their Member States to bear the brunt of their wrongful actions. 
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In some cases such as Behrami, even the Member States are not held accountable for the impugned 
actions or inactions, leaving the victims with no recourse for redress. 
Although in this era of human rights, the international arena has opened up to allow 
individuals to participate, the stage is still firmly set for the participation of States. This is 
demonstrated, among others, by challenges concerning the availability of and access to dispute 
handling mechanisms as will be discussed below. Resolution of disputes concerning subjects of 
international law other than States, is an area of international law that is still developing. 
 
III DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS FOR COMPLAINTS AGAINST 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 
 
Dispute settlement mechanisms on the international scene largely depend on who the complainant 
is and against whom the complaint is being made. Generally disputes between States have a better 
chance of being resolved because there exists in the international legal order various mechanisms 
and systems for resolving such disputes. This is perhaps due to the fact that as has been noted 
repeatedly, the international legal system was primarily designed for States. However in the current 
human rights dispensation, individuals are increasingly finding their voice in disputes concerning 
States.165 
On the other hand, complaints concerning IOs are resolved in a variety of ways depending 
on the organisation concerned and the entity making the complaint. It is a well-known fact that 
IOs, individuals and other entities do not have access to the ICJ, the main international forum for 
resolving disputes.166  This forum is exclusively reserved for States.167 In accordance with the 
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (CPIUN),168 the ICJ may only 
provide advisory opinions on question relating to the immunities of the UN. 
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It is rather amusing to note that despite the recognition by the ICJ that the UN has the 
capability of bringing international claims against States and other entities,169 such claims cannot 
be brought before the ICJ.170 Additionally, IOs normally have immunity before domestic courts. 
In this regard, disputes are normally resolved through the IO’s own internal mechanisms such as 
administrative tribunals, negotiations and ad hoc arbitration among others. The availability and 
effectiveness of these dispute settlements mechanisms will now be examined. 
 
(a) Internal Dispute Settlement Mechanisms 
 
(1) Employees and Other Categories of Staff Members 
   
Most internal dispute settlement mechanisms in IOs are for handling employee related disputes.171 
As will be discussed later in this thesis, immunities of IOs typically prevent employees from 
seeking redress at the domestic level. Considering the impact of these immunities on the rights of 
employees, particularly the right to access a Court, it is now widely recognized that IOs have a 
duty to provide alternative means of handling employment disputes.172 
 The CPIUN obliges the UN to provide settlement mechanisms for ‘disputes arising out of 
contracts or other disputes of a private law character to which the United Nations is a party.’173 
The ICJ has stated that section 29 of the CPIUN, places an obligation on the UN to make available 
dispute settlement mechanisms to entities which would otherwise have no means of seeking legal 
redress due to UN immunities.174 Non-compliance with section 29 does not however invalidate 
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UN immunity.175 A question therefore arises whether provisions such as section 29, serve any 
purpose at all.  
However there exists within the UN, dispute settlement mechanisms aimed at handling 
employment related disputes. Such mechanisms include the United Nations Dispute Tribunal 
(UNDT)176 and the United Nations Appeals Tribunal (UNAT).177 Both of these tribunals are 
judicial organs vested with the power to make binding decisions and to order remedies.178 Further, 
there exists the office of the Ombudsman for the UN Secretariat, Funds and Programs.179 Among 
other functions, the Office of the Ombudsman provides formal mediation facilities through its 
Mediation Division.180 
 The creation of these dispute settlement mechanisms is commendable. However some 
problems still exist. In accordance with their relevant statutes, the UNDT and the UNAT are only 
available to Members of Staff of the UN and not to other categories such as non-staff personnel.181 
In this regard, persons on individual contracts and individuals on special service agreements do 
not have access to these tribunals.182 The only available option for seeking redress using the 
internal mechanism for this category of employees is the UN Ombudsman.183 If the dispute cannot 
be resolved at this level, the only other option is arbitration. 184 However, as will be discussed in 
detail below, generally arbitration is not a very practical option for individuals due to the associated 
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exorbitant costs.185 Additionally, arbitration is best suited for commercial cases rather than 
employment cases, a fact which the UN itself is perfectly aware of.186  
With these prohibitive factors, it is highly unlikely that non-staff members aggrieved by 
the decisions and actions of the UN would opt for Arbitration as a dispute settlement mechanism. 
Resultantly it can be concluded that this category of employees does not have access to effective 
remedies for their grievances against the UN. Thus suggestions to amend the UNDT statute to 
allow access to non-staff members are very welcome.187  
(ii) Third Parties  
 
Blokker makes the observation that it is important for IOs to have ‘their own specific tailor made 
remedies’ to carter for situations where their activities cause harm.188 While progress has been 
made in the provision of dispute settlement mechanisms concerning employment related disputes, 
there has not been similar progress concerning mechanisms for handling complaints by third 
parties. This is a category of individuals who do not have any relationship (for instance through 
employment, commercial or other contracts) with an IO. Only a handful of IOs have mechanisms 
for considering complaints of third parties.  
The World Bank Inspection Panel (hereafter the ‘WBIP’) is an example of such an internal 
mechanism. Established in 1993 the WBIP is a mechanism for holding the bank accountable to 
those affected by its operations and in the projects which it finances.189 The WBIP is historic for 
being the first institutional complaint handling mechanism accessible to individuals outside an 
                                                          
185 See Miller, op cit note 175 at pp 97-98 on the matters relating to arbitration from the UN’s perspective. 
186 See Report of the Secretary General: Administration of Justice Report, UN Doc A/65/373, 16 September, 2010, 
para 179. 
187 Gulati, op-cit note 180 at p.525. See also the sentiments on Arbitration by the General Assembly in Sixth 
Committee, Summary Record of the 4th Meeting, 25 October, 2010, UN Doc. A/c.6/65/SR.4 paras 77-78. 
188 Blokker, op-cit note 10 at p. 330. 
189 See The World Bank Inspection Panel 12, IBRD No. 93-10, and IDA No. 95-6. (Sept 22 1993). 
44 
 
IO.190 A group of two or more persons affected or likely to be affected by a World Bank-funded 
project may make a written request for the carrying out of an inspection by the WBIP.191 
It must be noted however, that these requests for an inspection are not based on the general 
violation of human rights but on the Bank’s failure to follow its own policies and procedures with 
respect to a particular project or operation.192 Here again we see the problematic issue of the source 
of obligations of IOs discussed in Chapter 2, coming to the fore. In seeking to address the question 
of responsibility for alleged wrongful acts, the Bank relies on its own policies and procedures and 
not on general human rights norms and standards. It follows therefore that even if a complainant 
alleges violation of human rights, if those particular human rights are not recognized in its policies 
and procedures, the Bank will not take any action let alone accept responsibility.  
The inevitable question which arises is to what extent does the Bank’s policies and 
procedures incorporate human rights norms and standards? A study conducted by Meghan 
Natenson on the World Bank’s internal procedures and policies found that these procedures and 
policies do not incorporate the full range of human rights norms and standards.193 Thus the study 
concluded that the Bank’s accountability mechanisms ‘cannot address all human rights violations 
and are not fully human rights-compatible.’194 An earlier study found that: 
Unresolved legal obligations are the principle barriers to implementing a comprehensive human 
rights approach at the World Bank Group, from which all other barriers and gaps emanate…under 
international law, the WBG itself has not directly assumed any human rights obligations.195 
With such unresolved legal obligations, it is unsurprising that the Bank’s accountability 
mechanisms are not fully human rights compliant. All these factors notwithstanding however, the 
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World Bank can at least be applauded for endeavouring to make provision for mechanisms aimed 
at addressing complaints and resolving disputes with third parties.196 The same cannot be said for 
many other IOs which do not have similar mechanisms. Resultantly victims and complainants are 
forced to look elsewhere in order to seek relief as will be discussed below. 
 
(b) External Mechanisms  
 
It is a generally recognized factor that there is no general international forum in which victims of 
wrongful acts by IOs can lodge complaints. This glaring gap particularly affects third parties who 
do not have access to effective dispute settlement mechanisms. Sands and Klein rightly observe 
that, ‘…private third parties continue to have a marginal role; even where they are granted access 
to adjudicatory bodies, as in the EU, it is under strict and limited conditions…’197 Employees in 
most IOs at least have recourse to some form of dispute settlement mechanism as has been 
discussed above. Third parties on the other hand resort to ad hoc arbitration in order to settle 
disputes which they may have with IOs.198 The question therefore arises as to the effectiveness of 
ad hoc arbitration as a dispute settlement mechanism with special regard to third parties, 
particularly individuals.  
 As alluded to earlier on, one of the biggest concerns when it comes to arbitration is the 
associated cost. In disputes of a commercial nature, ad hoc arbitration (as opposed to institutional 
arbitration) is said to be preferred because of the absence of administrative fees.199  However in 
the case of individuals who only wish to seek relief for wrongful acts, arbitration fees and other 
costs related to arbitration may still be considered to be prohibitively high, despite the absence of 
administrative fees. Additionally, although ad hoc arbitration is said to be flexible in that the 
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parties can decide the terms of arbitration, the process of coming up with these terms can be time 
consuming resulting in more expenses and inconvenience for the victims.200 
 These problems associated with ad hoc arbitration have resulted in calls for a ‘centralised 
system of arbitration for responsibility disputes between claimants and IOs.’201 Blokker suggests 
that claimants against IOs can utilize the forum provided by the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
(PCA).202 In accordance with the applicable arbitration rules currently, the PCA can preside over 
claims concerning States, IOs and even private entities.203 However in accordance with Article 2 
of the 2012 PCA rules, an agreement by an IO to arbitrate constitutes a waiver of immunity from 
jurisdiction. IOs are typically reluctant to waive their immunities. This is perhaps why IOs in 
general and the UN specifically do not habitually utilize the PCA forum and opt instead to settle 
disputes by negotiation and ad hoc arbitration. The settlement of disputes in this manner 
(negotiation and ad hoc arbitration) is largely done at the discretion of the IOs concerned. For 
instance the payment of damages by UN is largely based on moral considerations rather than on 
any legal obligations.204 Resultantly if the UN opts not to settle or negotiate as has happened in 
many instances, there is little that a concerned victim can do.  
 The reality therefore is that in disputes between an IO and individuals, particularly third 
parties, the latter’s position is precarious. While the situation is not hopeless, in that some dispute 
settlement mechanisms exist, IOs are however firmly in control of most dispute settlement 
processes.  
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While the lack of effective dispute settlement mechanisms is a significant obstacle to an 
individual’s quest to seek redress, the various immunities and privileges which most IOs enjoy 
represent an even bigger obstacle as will be discussed below. 
 
IV  INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS’ IMMUNITY OR IMPUNITY?205 
The immunities and privileges of IOs and the lack of effective dispute settlement mechanisms are 
two sides of the same coin in all discussions concerning the difficulties of seeking redress for 
wrongful acts committed by IOs. It has been clearly demonstrated above that although there is a 
requirement for the provision of alternative dispute settlement mechanisms to counterpoise its 
‘absolute immunity’, the UN has not adequately provided these alternative mechanisms with the 
exception of its two administrative tribunals. Additionally, many IOs do not have provisions 
similar to section 29 of CPIUN and so although they enjoy immunities, only a handful of these 
organizations actually make provision for alternative dispute settlement mechanisms thereby 
violating rights on access to a court and a remedy.206 
 Considering the significance and impact of the immunities of IOs on the subject of the 
responsibility of IOs, it is rather surprising that the DARIO are completely silent on this issue. In 
this section, I discuss the concept of immunity as it applies to IOs, the realities of IO immunities 
as they relate to the rights of individuals and finally whether the rise in the promotion and 
protection of human rights has had an effect or impact on IO immunity. 
(a) The Immunities and Privileges of International Organizations: Conceptual Background 
 
The doctrine of immunity, especially when made in reference to States, has been in existence for 
a long time. Previously, immunity was thought to be absolute. Organs of State and government 
officials were completely immune from the jurisdiction of foreign governments.207 States have 
however moved away from this traditional approach to immunity and have since adopted the 
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‘restrictive’ approach.208 Restrictive immunity differentiates between acts performed in an official 
or sovereign capacity (jure imperii) and acts performed in a non-official or private capacity (jure 
gestionis).209 Thus States may be taken to Court for non-sovereign acts such as commercial 
transactions but may not be taken to Court for all acts performed in an official capacity.210 
 On the other hand, IO immunity is derived from treaties, constitutive documents of the 
organisations and domestic legislation to a certain extent.211 It would seem that, in the absence of 
relevant treaties, IO immunity is not recognised in most jurisdictions.212 Although IOs are 
increasingly performing State-like functions, they are not States.213 At best they can be regarded 
as ‘quasi-States.’214 However they are in some instances granted absolute immunity as is the case 
with the UN rather than the restrictive immunity currently applying to States.215  
The original framing of the UN’s immunity in Article 105(1) of the UN Charter216 was 
thought to be for the performance of specific functions and not for the provision of absolute 
immunity.217  Article 105(1) states that ‘the Organisation shall enjoy in the territory of each of its 
Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfilment of its purposes.’ It has 
been suggested that Article 105(1) should be read together with Articles 1(3), 55 and 56 of the 
Charter and that therefore the UN’s immunity is limited by its human rights obligations.218 Articles 
1(3), 55 and 56 make various references to the promotion and protection of human rights by the 
UN and its Member States.  
Looked at from this angle it can reasonably be argued that the violation of human rights is 
not in tandem with the fulfilment of its purposes and therefore, the UN should not enjoy immunity 
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in relation to these human rights violations. However any doubts as to the (absolute) immunity 
status of the UN were dissipated by CPIUN whose section 2 provides that  
The United Nations, its property and assets wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy 
immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as in any particular case it has expressly 
waived its immunity.  
The approach in domestic and regional Courts therefore is that the UN enjoys absolute 
immunity.219 Several justifications have been given for IO immunity. The most important 
justification is that privileges and immunities aid the independent functioning of IOs by preventing 
interference from States in which the IOs are operating.220 Further justifications include the 
prevention of fragmentation in the jurisprudence of IOs since different domestic courts would 
interpret issues differently.221 Further, it has been argued that allowing litigation in domestic courts 
would be tantamount to opening a Pandora’s Box of all manner of litigation against IOs.222  
Previously, it was even argued that domestic courts are not suitable forums for handling 
complaints concerning international organisations.223 This is debatable and thankfully does not 
represent the current practice of domestic courts and their capacity to handle disputes concerning 
IOs as evidenced by recent jurisprudence.224 This aspect of whether domestic systems and 
institutions can provide solutions to some of the problematic issues of seeking redress for wrongful 
acts committed by IOs will be explored in detail in Chapter 4.   
(b) Immunity and Access to Justice 
 
It is clear from the discussions above that the immunity from jurisdiction of IOs have an impact 
on the individual’s right to access justice. Such individuals may include employees, providers of 
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goods and services and other third parties who have in one way or another been negatively affected 
by the acts or omissions225 of IOs. It has been observed that  
The application of a rather strict system of immunities for International Organisations, and their 
officials, has led to a perception of impunity for violations of international law, and has on occasion 
left private law disputes unsettled.226 
However the growing emphasis on the promotion and protection of human rights in general 
and the right to access to justice in particular has had an impact on IO immunity. Ryngaert observes 
that domestic Courts (particularly in Europe) are increasingly adopting a human rights approach 
to immunity.227 As per this approach, IO immunity will only be upheld if the victim of a wrongful 
act has access to alternative means of redress provided by the IO.228 Some commentators perceive 
that the provision of such alternative dispute settlement mechanism is actually mandatory: 
…the setting up of alternative means of redress, even when not foreseen in treaty provisions, is 
deemed to be compulsory for any entity claiming immunity from jurisdiction of domestic courts. 
Second, if such duty is not complied with, immunity cannot be complied with.229 
Though a majority of domestic Courts advocating for the human rights approach to IO 
immunity are in Europe, instances can be found where domestic Courts in other regions adopted a 
similar approach. In fact as far back as 1983, the Constitutional Court of Argentina held that the 
recognition of IO immunity without any alternative dispute settlement mechanism was 
incompatible with the Constitution.230 The Court further stated that the individual’s right to access 
justice is mandatory and that therefore any treaty giving effect to immunity without providing for 
a dispute settlement mechanism is void.231  The legal basis for this supposition is of course 
debatable. Is the implication that the right to access justice is a peremptory norm? Di Fillipo states 
that perhaps the Court’s stance should be understood from the tendency of Latin American 
jurisdictions of ‘identifying more and more provisions of human rights as peremptory rules’232  
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It is noteworthy however, that after this 1983 case, the respondent (Technical Mixed 
Commission on the Salte Grande) established an Arbitral Tribunal catering for all manner of 
complaints including those from employees and other third parties. As noted by Di Fillipo, in 
subsequent pronouncements since the establishment of the Arbitral Tribunal, the respondent’s 
immunity was recognized and given effect since an alternative dispute settlement mechanism had 
been provided.233 
Similarly in the African region, instances can be found where domestic Courts overlooked 
immunity and proceeded to hear complaints against IOs. In Tononoka Steels Ltd v. The Eastern 
and Southern African Trade and Development Bank,234 the Court of Appeal in Kenya held that 
although the respondent enjoyed various immunities and privileges by virtue of being an IO, it was 
not immune from suits arising as a result of commercial transactions. In setting aside a High Court 
order which had dismissed the application on the basis of the respondent’s immunity, the Presiding 
Justice of Appeal stated that he was unaware of any  
…country which would allow banking and financial services with absolute immunity from 
suits and legal process and with absolutely no protection for its hapless customers.235  
Similar sentiments were expressed in International Committee of the Red Cross v. Sibanda 
and Ngangura,236 where the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe upheld the finding of the High Court 
that the Appellant was not immune to labour related claims brought against it.237 The Respondents 
had commenced action in the High Court in order to compel the Appellant IO to comply with the 
applicable retrenchment regulations at the termination of the Respondents’ contracts.  
In both Tononoka and Sibanda, the Courts did not directly refer to the right of access to 
justice, it is obvious however that welfare of the individuals involved were on the mind of the 
Court since upholding immunity claims by the IO would have denied these individuals any 
recourse to a remedy. 
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 This encouraging trend has sadly not yet significantly dented the UN’s absolute immunity 
as the widely known events in Haiti demonstrate. In October, 2010 Cholera broke out in Haiti. The 
outbreak was attributed to Nepalese UN peacekeepers238 who were part of a UN Stabilisation 
Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). An investigation carried out by a UN panel of experts found that 
the cholera outbreak had been as a result of improper management of ‘human faecal waste’ in the 
MINUSTAH camp.239 At the time of the investigation, nearly 4, 900 people had died and almost 
155,000 people had been hospitalized.240 Although things have significantly improved, Cholera 
remains a problem in present day Haiti.241 
 Claims lodged with the UN in November 2011, on behalf of the victims of the outbreak, 
were deemed ‘not receivable by reason of the absolute immunity of the UN.’242 Additionally, the 
UN has not set up any alternative dispute resolution mechanisms to handle claims arising out of 
this tragic event. The UN has thus breached section 29 of CPIUN. In terms of Peace-Keeping 
Operations, the UN’s ‘Model Status of Forces Agreement for Peace-Keeping Operations’ 
(hereafter ‘the Model SOFA’) has provisions for appropriate structures and systems for resolving 
disputes.243 In accordance with Article 51 of the Model SOFA, the UN is to set up a Claims 
Commission to handle any private law disputes. In the Haiti Cholera incident, no such Commission 
has been created. Further efforts to seek redress through the US courts have so far not yielded any 
fruits since three different Courts have upheld the UN’s immunity.244 Resultantly the victims of 
this wrongful act at the instance of the UN remain without a remedy. 
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 It remains to be seen whether the door which is ‘ajar for a human rights-based challenge to 
the UN’s immunity’245 will be widely opened so that victims of wrongful acts as is the instance in 
Haiti will have a chance of seeking redress. 
 
V  CONCLUSION 
 
It has been argued that although there are some IOs whose activities impinge on the rights of 
individuals, a majority of the IOs do not cause any harm. Blokker notes that: 
‘…there are currently hundreds of international organisations, of which only a limited number 
carry out activities themselves that may result in harm. The impression is sometimes given…. That 
activities of international organisations in general cause…harm, that they often deny responsibility 
if claims are brought against them and subsequently claim immunity before a national Court.’246 
Blokker’s assertion may be true. However, even if only a limited number of organisations 
are actually causing harm, there is still need for systems and mechanisms enabling victims to seek 
redress for wrongs committed by those IOs. Additionally, as observed by Wellens, such systems 
must be effective and adequate.247 In the current state of affairs at international law, those with 
some form of a relationship with IOs have a better chance of having their disputes resolved because 
of the internal mechanisms such as administrative tribunals of most IOs. Third parties however are 
in a difficult position because most IOs do not have mechanisms for resolving disputes with third 
parties. 
The prevailing argument throughout this dissertation is that seeking redress for wrongful 
acts committed by an IO is an uphill task. However, despite the many difficulties encountered by 
victims of wrongful acts committed by IOs, the human rights approach to IO immunity represents 
a silver lining in the clouds. Jurisprudence is developing to the effect that immunity from 
jurisdiction will only be upheld if an IO has provided alternative dispute settlement mechanisms. 
Further, in some jurisdictions, Courts view IO immunity to be restrictive rather than absolute. In 
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this regard, it is clearly obvious that domestic Courts have a very important role in upholding the 
right of access to justice for victims of wrongful acts committed by IOs as will be elaborated in 






















CLOSING THE ACCOUNTABILTY GAP: DOES THE ANSWER LIE WITH 
DOMESTIC COURTS? 
 
I  INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter three discussed in detail the difficult path of individuals who try to seek redress for 
wrongful acts committed by IOs. The difficulties highlighted included the complex interplay 
between IOs and their member States, uncertainties concerning dispute settlement mechanisms 
and the most difficult hurdle of all which concerns the immunities and privileges of IOs. It was 
also highlighted however that the human rights approach to immunity which both domestic and 
regional Courts are increasingly adopting, provides a beacon of hope to those wronged by IOs. 
 Building on the in-roads which a human rights approach to IO immunity seems to have 
made, this Chapter explores the role of domestic courts in disputes concerning IOs. Specifically, 
the chapter examines the extent to which domestic systems and particularly judicial institutions 
can help keep IOs accountable for their actions and therefore aid the individual’s quest to seek 
redress for wrongful acts committed by IOs. In this regard, section II examines the phenomenon 
of IOs appearing before domestic courts and discusses such issues as the suitability of domestic 
courts as a forum for resolving disputes concerning IOs. Section III pays closer attention to 
organisations such as the UN (whose immunity is yet to be affected by the human rights 
approach)248 and questions whether domestic systems have any role to play in keeping these 
particular IOs accountable. Finally, section IV finally offers conclusions to this discussion. 
 
II  INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS BEFORE DOMESTIC COURTS: 
OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES 
 
The phenomenon of IOs appearing before domestic courts seems rather a contradiction in terms 
when regard is had to the fact that the major purpose of the various immunities which IOs enjoy 
is to prevent this very phenomenon from happening in the first place. Yet more and more IOs find 
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themselves being dragged before domestic or regional Courts.249 Although a majority of these 
cases are in Europe, there is some evidence of similar occurrences in other parts of the world as 
alluded to in Chapter 3.250 Immunities from legal process, derived from a variety of sources251 play 
an important role in ensuring the independent functioning of IOs.252 At the same time however, 
when wrongs have been committed by these IO, it is these same immunities which prevent victims 
from accessing justice and thereby creating an accountability gap,253 as discussed in Chapter 3. As 
more and more IOs appear before domestic courts, several issues arise as will be discussed below. 
(a) Are Domestic Courts the Right Forum? 
 
In the phenomenon of domestic courts presiding over IO related disputes, the inevitable question 
which arises is whether such courts are a suitable forum.254 This question often relates to the 
capacity of domestic Courts to handle such disputes and other procedural issues such as whether 
these IOs would be accorded a fair trial.255  
 On the question concerning the capacity of domestic or even regional courts to handle 
disputes concerning IOs, it must be stated that most of these disputes pertain to contracts, 
employment, tort and related matters. These same type of cases are routinely handled by domestic 
courts almost on a daily basis.  As Reinisch notes, it would be rather unreasonable to argue that 
domestic courts do not have the expertise to handle such cases.256 They therefore undoubtedly have 
the expertise and capacity to handle these cases. The several cases cited herein clearly demonstrate 
domestic Courts ably handling disputes concerning IOs.257 
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Perhaps, more complicated disputes concerning such issues as the internal matters of IOs 
or an IO’s dispute with its Member State would hardly be suitable for the forum of a domestic 
Court. To a large extent this would be due to the fact there are better avenues, forums and 
mechanisms for resolving those types of issues and not because domestic Courts lack the requisite 
capacity of handling complex international law questions.258 Nollkaemper observes that many 
domestic Courts, have become familiar with engaging with international law principles and 
norms.259 In any case, from the perspective of this thesis, rarely do such (complicated) matters 
directly impinge on an individual’s human rights. 
It has also been argued that disputes arising out of peace –keeping operations might not be 
suitable for domestic forums due to the political sensitivities involved.260 To begin with, it must 
be stated that domestic courts have on several occasions ably handled disputes arising out of 
peacekeeping operations, although in most instances IO immunity was upheld.261 Secondly, the 
UN itself sometimes makes a decision not to invoke the immunity of its officials in domestic 
Courts in relation to specific acts.262 Finally, it is unclear which forum would then be suitable for 
resolving disputes arising out of peace-keeping operations, bearing in mind the lack of forums for 
lodging claims against IOs. The plight of individuals who have suffered harm in peacekeeping 
operations becomes more pertinent in cases such as the Haiti Cholera catastrophe where claims for 
reparation have been deemed ‘non-receivable’ and the UN has not set up alternative dispute 
settlement mechanisms. 
 Closely related to questions on the capacity of domestic courts are also concerns of whether 
due process would be followed and that there would not be any biases against an IO.263 These are 
indeed valid concerns. It has been noted that the apprehension concerning bias and sometimes 
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263 Blokker, Niels ‘International Organisations: The Untouchables’ (2014) 10 International Organisation Law 
Review 259 at p 272. 
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questionable court procedures are among the key reasons for the insistence on IO immunity.264 An 
IO just like any other person (natural or legal) appearing before a court has or should have a 
legitimate expectation of a fair trial. It must be stated however, that so far in the decided cases 
concerning disputes between IOs and individuals in domestic courts, allegations of bias and 
questionable court procedures have rarely been made. It can even be argued that if there were such 
allegations of bias, the IO has or would have several options at its disposal for dealing with the 
alleged unbecoming behaviour of one of the institutions of its Member State.265  
 From the perspective of the victim, a domestic court presiding over a dispute concerning 
an IO is beneficial in several ways. Bearing in mind the problems associated with the lack of 
appropriate dispute settlement mechanisms, including the lack of relevant forums, domestic courts 
provide the victim with a forum in which his or her complaint can be heard. Additionally the matter 
is heard at presumably lower costs compared to the quite significant costs associated with 
international litigation.266 In some instances, domestic courts represent the only available option 
for individuals to access justice in their disputes with IOs. 
 It has been observed however that giving effect to the individual’s need for accessing 
justice on the one hand and ensuring the independent functioning of IOs by upholding immunity 
on the other hand is a delicate balancing act.267 In this regard, recourse to a domestic Court for 
disputes concerning IOs should be the exception rather than the norm.268 The role of domestic 
courts should only be to preside over disputes concerning IOs where such IOs have not provided 
alternative means of dispute resolution. 
 
(b) To Pierce or Not to Pierce the Immunity Veil: The ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Mechanism’ Test 
 
The emerging trend of only upholding IO immunity in domestic or regional courts if the concerned 
IO has provided alternative disputes settling mechanisms has been discussed in detail elsewhere 
                                                          
264 Reinisch op-cit, note 253 p.579. 
265 For instance engaging with the Member State at the appropriate political level or in General Assemblies of the 
Organisation.  
266 For instance costs associated arbitration, see notes 199-200 and accompanying text. 
267 Reinisch op cit note 253 p. 578. 
268 Ibid 587. 
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in this thesis.269 It must be stated that it is not the aim of this author to argue for the complete 
abolition of the various immunities and privileges which IOs enjoy. In any event such abolition is 
unlikely to happen. This is due to the sobering reality that although some domestic courts have 
pierced the immunity veil and presided over disputes concerning IOs, in the large majority of cases 
before domestic courts, IO immunity is upheld.270 
Certainly, there is merit in maintaining and upholding the privileges and immunities of 
IOs. In Waite and Kennedy v Germany, the Court noted that: 
…the attribution of privileges and immunities to international organisations is an essential means 
of ensuring the proper functioning of such organisations, free from unilateral interference by 
individual governments….The immunity from jurisdiction commonly accorded by states to 
international organisations….is a long standing practice established in the interest of the good 
workings of the organisations.271  
 
The independent functioning of IOs is thus certainly dependent on these privileges and 
immunities. However with the increasing focus on the promotion and protection of human rights, 
it is no longer or rather it should no longer be acceptable for IOs to commit wrongs and then hide 
behind immunity. If the IO engaging in wrongful conduct has not provided any alternative means 
of resolving disputes, domestic courts are justified in their interventions to ensure that the hapless 
individual who would otherwise have no remedy can have access to justice. 
The question which needs to be addressed however is what should that intervention look 
like? This question is important because both the independent functioning of the IO (without 
unnecessary intrusion into its affairs by the Forum State) and the human rights of the individual 
need to be taken into account. As previously stated, the balancing act is a delicate one. 
 Both Bradlow and Reinisch suggest that all disputes concerning IOs which have been filed 
in domestic courts should be subjected to the ‘alternative dispute settlement mechanism’ test.272 
                                                          
269 See Chapter 3 (IV) (b).    
270 This is true concerning many IOs but especially true concerning the UN. See generally sentiments expressed in 
Nico Schrijver, ‘Beyond Srebrenica and Haiti: Exploring Alternative Remedies against the United Nations’ (2014) 
10(2) International Organisations Law Review 588. 
271 Supra note 172 at para 63. See also Daniel Bradlow, ‘Using a Shield as a Sword: Are International Organisations 
Abusing their Immunity?’ (2017) 31(1) Temple International and Comparative Law Journal 45 pp 45-46  the author 
states that: “Most IOs, unlike States, do not control territory or a population and so always operate within the 
jurisdiction of one of their member States. This makes them vulnerable to interference by these States”.  
272 Bradlow op cit note 271 at p. 67 and Reinisch op-cit note 253 at p 587. 
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That is, domestic courts should ascertain whether the IO being complained against has in place 
alternative remedies or dispute resolution mechanisms which the complainant can access. If these 
mechanisms are available, the Court should proceed to uphold IO immunity and therefore dismiss 
the claim. In Waite and Kennedy v Germany the Court upheld the decision of the domestic court 
in upholding the immunity of an IO on the basis that the applicants had available to them 
alternative means of resolving disputes.273 
 Domestic courts should however not merely ascertain the existence of alternative 
settlement mechanisms, it should also check the quality of those mechanisms.274 In upholding 
IO immunity, the Court in Waite and Kennedy did not only confirm the presence of alternative 
remedies, it had to satisfy itself of the availability to the applicants, ‘reasonable alternative means 
to effectively protect their rights under the Convention’ (emphasis supplied).275 The Court further 
discussed the several options or remedies available to the applicants, noting among others the 
independence of some of the agencies tasked with handling complaints against the IO in 
question.276 
 Where a domestic court cannot ascertain the availability of alternative dispute settlement 
mechanisms or where the mechanisms available do not provide effective protection of rights 
(under applicable domestic or international law), the court should preside over the matter and 
therefore pierce the veil of immunity. In Western European Union v Siedler277 the Belgian 
Supreme Court refused to uphold the Appellant’s immunity on the basis that although the 
Appellant had made provision for a dispute settlement mechanism, such mechanism did not 
provide effective protection of the rights of the respondent.278 The Court was particularly 
concerned with the lack of independence of the dispute settlement mechanism provided by the 
Appellant.279 
                                                          
273 Supra note 172, para 73. 
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 The ‘alternative dispute settlement mechanism’ test ensures that the rights of the individual 
are protected. This is done by affording the individual an opportunity to seek redress in a domestic 
court for an IO’s wrongful acts, if the IO has not made alternative arrangements for resolving 
disputes. At the same time, if an IO has put in place appropriate dispute settling mechanisms, its 
immunity is respected and upheld. Thus to avoid any perceived ‘tampering’ with their immunities, 
IOs are incentivized to make provision for alternative dispute settlement mechanisms.280 
It is evident therefore, that domestic or regional courts have an important role to play in 
upholding the rights of individuals who have been wronged by IOs. This seems certainly true in 
tort, contract, labour and other related matters. Do domestic Courts have a role to play when 
dealing with IOs possessing absolute immunity? 
 
III  DOMESTIC COURTS AND ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY: WILL THE ‘
 UNTOUCHABLES’281 REMAIN UNTOUCHED? 
 
This wave of a human rights approach to immunity has not yet significantly affected UN immunity. 
Several challenges to the absolute immunity of the UN have been brought in domestic and regional 
courts and the result has been that the absolute immunity of the UN has been upheld.282 The cases 
of Brzak v United Nations283 and Georges v United Nations284are particularly significant in terms 
of their relevance to the discussion at hand. In Brzak, the case concerned the manner in which a 
complaint pertaining to sexual harassment had been handled within the UN’s complaints handling 
mechanism.  The Plaintiffs’ arguments were to the effect that the alternative dispute settlement 
mechanisms made available by the UN were inadequate and that therefore UN immunity should 
be waived on this basis.285 The case of Georges on the other hand concerned the fact that the UN 
did not make available to the victims of the cholera epidemic in Haiti, any alternative dispute 
                                                          
280 Reinisch op-cit note 253 at p. 587 notes that in the trail of Waite and Kennedy, IOs have made some efforts 
towards making provision for alternative dispute settlement mechanisms. 
281 Blokker, op cit note 263. 
282 See for instance Mothers of Srebrenica, supra note 160 and Georges v United Nations, (in the District Court, 
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settling mechanisms thereby violating their right to an effective remedy.286 In both cases, UN 
immunity was upheld and the cases were dismissed. 
 As regards the UN and related IOs, should the conclusion therefore be that domestic courts 
have no role to play in the conflict between absolute immunity and the right to an effective remedy?  
While the options are indeed limited, it is argued that domestic courts are not completely helpless 
in the face of such ‘untouchable’ IOs as the UN. 
 
(a) Influencing Human Rights Compliance through the Backdoor: Kadi v Council of the 
European Union 
 
The Kadi cases287 have generated significant amounts of academic literature.288 The judgments 
have been analysed from a variety of perspectives including the interplay between different legal 
systems, particularly international law and EU law289 and the protection of human rights290 among 
others. In this section, the Kadi cases are discussed from the perspective of the role of domestic or 
regional courts in the provision of relief for wrongful acts of seemingly ‘untouchable’ IOs. 
 The Kadi case concerned the implementation of UNSC Resolutions requiring among 
others, the freezing of funds and other assets of persons who, allegedly, had ties to Osama bin 
Laden, Al Qaeda and the Taliban.291 In order to implement these Resolutions, the EU adopted 
                                                          
286 Supra note 284. 
287 Joined cases c-402 and C-415/05 P, Yasin Abdullah Kadi and Al Narakaat International Foundation v Council of 
the European Union and Commission of the European Communities. 
288 See Sara Poli and Maria Tzanou, ‘The Kadi Rulings: A Survey of the Literature’ (2009) 28 Year Bok of 
European Law 593 for an overview of the literature written before 2009. See also Juliane Kokott and Christoph 
Sobotta, ‘The Kadi Case-Constitutional Core Values and International Law-Finding the Balance?’ (2012) 23 (4) 
European Journal of International Law 1015 and Koen Lenarts, ‘The Kadi Saga and the Rule of Law within the 
EU’ (2014) 67 (4) SMU Law Review 707.  
289 Krenzler and Landwehr, ‘A new Legal Order of International Law: On the the Relationship between Public 
International Law and European Union Law after Kadi,’ in U. Fastenrath (ed) From Bilateralism to Community 
Interest. Essays in Honour of Judge Bruno Simma (2011), 1004.  
290 Enzo Cannizzaro, ‘Security Council Resolutions and EC Fundamental Rights: Some Remarks on the ECJ 
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World Order,’ (2009) 46 Common Market Law Review 13. 
291S/RES/1390 (2002) which condemned the Taliban and the Al Qaeda for various terrorist activities including the 
11 September 2001 attacks in the United States. The Resolution required UN Member states to freeze assets of, 
impose travel and arms sales restrictions to members of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and all associated persons and 
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Regulation 881/2002 which contained a list of the persons targeted by the sanctions. These people 
were however not informed of the reasons for their inclusion on the list and the subsequent freezing 
of their assets. Mr. Kadi was among the people appearing on that list and therefore had his assets 
frozen. He challenged regulation 881/2002 for infringing upon his right to be heard and his right 
to property among others. 
 Implementation of Regulation 881/2002 was upheld by the EU Commission. The matter 
went for appeal in the European Court of Justice (hereafter the ‘ECJ’). The ECJ faulted Regulation 
881/2002 for violating several of the appellants’ rights. The Court held that the failure to inform 
the appellants of the reasons for being included on the sanctions list, led to the deprivation of the 
right to be heard and the right to effective judicial review. 292 In this regard, the limitation of the 
right to property, carried out through freezing of the appellant’s assets lacked justification.293 
Regulation 881/2002, to the extent that it concerned the appellants, was therefore nullified.  
 If the appellants had directly dragged the UN to Court challenging their inclusion on the 
sanctions list and how this had violated several of their rights, the result would undoubtedly have 
been that the UN enjoys absolute immunity and its actions cannot be challenged in a domestic or 
regional court. By using their own domestic/regional law to challenge implementation of the 
sanctions, the appellants were able to sidestep the challenge of UN immunity.  
More significant however, are the changes that have occurred within the UN concerning 
the management of the sanctions list in the aftermath of the Kadi cases.294 To begin with in 2008, 
the UNSC created the concept of narrative summaries which provide information pertaining to 
reasons why particular individuals have been included on the sanctions list.295 Persons appearing 
on the list are therefore not completely in the dark concerning grounds for such an appearance as 
was the case before Kadi. Secondly and more importantly, the UNSC established the office of the 
                                                          
entities (see para 2). Also S/RES/1373(2001) which called upon States to take a variety of measures in combating 
terrorism.   
292 Supra note 287, para 334-336. 
293 Ibid paras 369-370. 
294 See in-depth discussions on this by Kokott and Sobotta op-cit note 288. See also Francesco Giumelli and Fillipo 
Costa Buranelli, ‘When States and Individuals Meet: The UN Ombudsperson as a ‘Contact Point’ between 
International and World Society,’ (2019) 00(0) International Relations 1 at pp 12-15. 
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Ombudsperson in 2009.296 This office was established for the main purpose of assisting the 
Sanctions Committee in processing delisting requests.297 This office receives delisting requests, 
gathers the necessary information and makes recommendations to the Sanctions Committee. If the 
request for delisting has been rejected by the Sanctions Committee, the office of the Ombudsperson 
notifies the concerned person or organisation accordingly. The reasons for the rejection are 
included in the notification.298  
 The UNSC processes established in the aftermath of Kadi, have made the listing process 
more transparent than the situation was previously. While it might be difficult to state with any 
measure of certainty that these changes would not have occurred had Mr. Kadi not challenged 
Regulation 881/2002, the key role which the ruling of the ECJ played in setting into motion 
changes in the UNSC listing processes, cannot be denied. This regional court accomplished the 
extraordinary feat of indirectly challenging the wrongful acts of the UN and through the backdoor 
influenced some measure of respect for human rights in listing processes.   
(b) Holding States Responsible for Wrongs Committed by International Organisations 
  
Domestic Courts may also be of assistance by holding Member States liable for wrongs committed 
by IOs. This typically applies to situations where the immunity of the IO concerned has been 
upheld but the IO has not made available any alternative means of resolving the dispute. The 
rationale behind this approach is that the primary obligation to ensure access to court for the 
individuals within its territory, rests upon the State. The granting of immunity to an IO by the State 
restricts this right, therefore if an IO cannot be held responsible for its wrongful acts that 
responsibility should rest on the State. 
 Several Courts have upheld this line of thinking. For instance the case of  X v Deodato299 
concerned the applicant’s failure to collect rentals from a diplomat. The Spanish Court hearing the 
matter held that the applicant could claim damages suffered, from the government if the 
government insisted on upholding the immunity of the diplomat. Similarly in France, the Council 
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of State (Conseil d’Etat) held that an applicant could claim compensation from the government for 
failing to access a Court to obtain relief against a UNICEF employee.300 Further the Constitutional 
Court of Colombia held that the government was liable to compensate an individual who could not 
access the courts as a result of the immunity of an IO.301 
 It might seem unfair to hold the State responsible for the wrongs of an IO.302 However from 
a victim centered perspective, this approach avoids a situation where individuals wronged by IOs 
are left empty handed due to the operation of immunities granted to IOs. As the court observed in 
Waite and Kennedy, the granting of immunities to IOs affects some fundamental rights, however 
States are not absolved from the responsibility of protecting and promoting those rights affected 
by such immunities.303 If an individual cannot seek redress from an IO because of that IO’s 
immunity, that individual should be able to seek redress from the State which granted that 
immunity. 
 
IV  CONCLUSION 
 
Domestic Courts have an important role to play in upholding the rights of individuals who have 
been wronged by IOs. Immunities granted to IOs are important as they assist in the independent 
functioning of those IOs. However these immunities affect the rights of individuals concerning 
access to justice. In this regard, the role of domestic courts in ascertaining not only whether these 
IOs have provided for alternative dispute settlement mechanism but also the quality of those 
mechanisms provides a lifeline to wronged individuals. Where IOs have not provided for such 
dispute settlement mechanisms, it is only fair for domestic or regional courts to pierce the 
immunity veil and preside over the dispute. This approach acts as an incentive to IOs to provide 
for alternative dispute settlement mechanisms to avoid any interference with their immunity. 
                                                          
300 Ministre des Affaires etrangeeres v Dame Burgat et autres, 29 October 1976, Conseil d’Etat in France, Recueil 
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 When dealing with more difficult IOs such as the UN, domestic or regional courts can 
attempt to circumvent the immunity hurdle by indirectly challenging the acts of the IO using the 
requirements of domestic or regional law. Additionally, domestic or regional courts may hold 
States responsible for the wrongdoings of IOs. Immunities are granted by States and if an 
individual fails to seek redress for the wrongful acts of an IO, due to the operation of these 
immunities, the State should be held responsible for the conduct of the IO. Perhaps, domestic 
courts represent a light at the end of the tunnel for individuals wronged by IOs. Whether this light 























The question concerning responsibility for wrongful acts committed by IOs is a complex one, 
consisting of several dimensions. Indeed IO responsibility has been and continues to be a subject 
of significant interest in international law. While the theory is clear that IOs will be responsible 
for their wrongful acts, the reality is that it is not easy for an individual to seek redress for these 
wrongful acts. The major challenges include lack of clarity of the obligations binding IOs, some 
problematic issues concerning the primary norms, immunities and privileges of IOs, lack of 
effective dispute resolution mechanisms and the difficulties involved in apportioning 
responsibility between an IO and its member states in peace-keeping and similar operations. 
In this thesis, the subject of IO responsibility was approached from the perspective of the 
victims of wrongful acts. The main research question was how accessible is justice for victims of 
wrongful acts committed by IOs? In this regard, a detailed analysis of the various obstacles and 
difficulties of seeking redress from IOs both on the international and domestic scene was 
conducted. Further, the role of domestic systems and judicial institutions in upholding the rights 
of those seeking redress from IOs was examined. 
 
II THE ROOT OF THE PROBLEM 
 
In order to understand the basis of IO responsibility in international law, an examination of the 
primary norms (consisting the source of obligations of IOs) and the secondary norms (regulating 
the responsibility of IOs for breaching the primary norms) had to be conducted. It was found that 
some of the difficulties of seeking redress for wrongful IO conduct can be traced to the lack of 
clarity of the primary norms and some problematic issues concerning the secondary norms. 
Regarding the primary norms, it is clear that IOs are bound by obligations arising out of 
their constitution or constitutive documents, agreements which they have entered into and general 
principles of international law among others. However the bone of contention is whether IOs are 
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bound by human rights obligations and if so, on what basis. The question arises from the fact that 
generally, IOs are not signatories to human rights treaties, which treaties are the major source of 
human rights obligations. The difficulty therefore lies in identifying a basis for binding IOs to 
human rights obligations outside human rights treaties. This task has not been an easy one, 
resultantly most IOs do not consider themselves bound by human rights obligations or only 
consider themselves bound to some and not the full range of human rights obligations. 
On the other hand, the attribution of responsibility where multiple stakeholders are 
involved was found to be the major problematic issue concerning the secondary norms. The 
problem stems from the application of the effective control test in order to determine responsibility. 
This is especially applicable in peace keeping operations which involve a variety of stakeholders 
including IOs and Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs). It was found that in such peace keeping 
operations, it is not always clear who has effective control over peace-keeping forces and 
operations. Apportioning blame and responsibility in these circumstances therefore becomes an 
uncertain and complicated task. Unfortunately those on the receiving end of this uncertainty are 
the individuals who have suffered harm arising from peacekeeping operations. 
 
III FURTHER OBSTACLES AHEAD 
 
Moving past the problems associated with the primary and secondary norms it was found that 
further problems awaited those seeking justice from IOs. It was found that the availability or lack 
thereof of dispute resolution mechanisms aimed at handling complaints against IOs was another 
obstacle. Generally, individuals who are in some form of a relationship with an IO stand a better 
chance of having their disputes resolved. This is due to the fact that mechanisms exist within the 
internal structures of some IOs for handling these disputes. Third parties who do not have any form 
of relationship or who do not have a clearly defined relationship with IOs are in a rather precarious 
position. This is because only a handful of IOs have mechanisms for handling disputes with third 
parties, often opting to settle disputes through negotiations and ad hoc arbitration. These methods 
of settling disputes are however engaged in at the sole discretion of the IO concerned. In other 
words if an IO is not willing to engage in negotiations or arbitration, there is very little a wronged 
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individual can do to compel the IO to resolve the matter. The lack of a general international forum 
for handling complaints against IOs compounds the problem. 
Finally, on the problems associated with seeking redress for IOs’ wrongful conduct, the immunities 
and privileges which IOs enjoy constitute the biggest obstacle. On one hand, immunities are 
important because they aid the independent functioning of IOs. On the other hand however, these 
immunities operate to prevent individuals from accessing justice in domestic and other courts. The 
emergence of a human rights approach to immunity however, provides a beacon of hope. This 
approach is to the effect that the immunity of an IO will only be upheld if the IO concerned has 
made provisions for alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. 
 
IV THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS 
 
The research conducted in this thesis clearly demonstrates the plight of those who have been 
harmed by the conduct of IOs. The need for effective ways of holding IOs accountable cannot 
therefore be overemphasised. Domestic Courts might not have all the solutions to the problems 
associated with seeking relief for wrongs committed by IOs. However they have a very key role 
to play in the accountability of IOs. In this regard, two major recommendations are made as 
follows: 
(a) Firstly and most importantly, the role of domestic and regional courts in holding IOs 
accountable should be strengthened. This is important for various reasons as follows: 
 
(i) To begin with, there are no indications that a general international forum for 
resolving complaints against IOs will be established soon. In this regard 
therefore, domestic courts provide a forum for resolving complaints against IOs 
to individuals who would otherwise have no means of accessing justice. This is 
especially true for third parties who in most cases do not have access to internal 
dispute resolving mechanisms of an IO. 
 
(ii) Secondly domestic and regional courts have the ability to use their own laws 
and systems to influence respect for human rights as demonstrated by the case 
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of Kadi. This is especially true when wrongful acts have been committed by 
organisations such as the UN which enjoy absolute immunity. Additionally, 
domestic or regional Courts have the ability to hold states liable for the 
wrongful acts of IOs where the immunity veil of an IO cannot be pierced as has 
been explained in Chapter 4. 
 
(iii) Finally, domestic courts can enforce the ‘alternative mechanism test’ when 
dealing with complaints against IOs. It has been demonstrated that applying this 
test ensures that the right of access to justice or access to a remedy is protected, 
while at the same time ensuring that the immunities of IOs are protected since 
IOs will be encouraged to provide alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in 
a bid to prevent any tampering with their immunities.  
 
(b) In line with recommendation in (a) above, there is need for the DARIO or similar 
instruments to provide clear guidelines on the role of domestic courts in the resolution 
of disputes concerning IOs. It is clear that the human rights approach to IO immunity 
is gaining ground. It is also clear that this human rights approach affects the 
responsibility of IOs. There is therefore need for proper regulations on how both States 
and IO should conduct themselves. 
  
V THE FAINT LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL. 
 
In the final analysis, justice for wrongs committed by IOs is not easily accessible especially for 
individuals. However recent developments heralded by increased attention on the promotion and 
protection of human rights offer hope and therefore represent a light at the end of the tunnel. 
However there is still lack of a general international forum tasked with handling IO related disputes 
and there are no indications that such a forum will be available in the near future. Additionally the 
human rights approach to immunity has not yet significantly dented the absolute immunity of the 
UN and allied IOs. Therefore, although the light is shining at the end of the tunnel, it is doing so 
faintly. With the increased and sustained pressure for the promotion and protection of human 
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